Since Oct. 7, Israel has been engaged in a war of necessity, with the primary—albeit unspoken—goal of restoring the deterrence utterly shattered by Hamas’s surprise attack. The achievements of the prolonged fighting in Gaza, the ability to simultaneously address other fronts and the effort to free the hostages, despite the political pressures and complex economic and social challenges, are central elements in rebuilding this deterrence.
Added to this are the IDF’s daring hostage-rescue operations, the Israeli strike on Yemen’s Al-Hodeida port and the assassinations of senior Hezbollah and Hamas figures in Beirut and Tehran (though Israel has not claimed responsibility for the latter). These actions not only demonstrate high intelligence and operational capabilities, but also show a willingness to take significant risks. Moreover, they reflect the political leadership’s confidence in the security agencies’ abilities, which also impacts Israel’s standing in the eyes of its enemies.
A coordinated and sustained response
As these lines are written, security tensions in the region are at their peak. Senior Iranian officials are discussing with representatives of Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’ite militias and the Houthis in Yemen the possible responses to Israel. Each of these Iranian proxies has unresolved issues with Israel, and a coordinated response is expected.
For Iran, the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh was a severe blow to national pride. If such a high-profile figure can be targeted on the president’s inauguration day, in the guest house in Tehran of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while Iranian security forces are at their highest alert, no one in Iran is safe.
Moreover, the assassination came less than a day after Hezbollah No. 2 Fuad Shukr was killed in Beirut and not long after the airstrike on the Hodeida port and the assassination of Hamas military leader Mohammed Deif in Gaza. In this respect, the elimination of Haniyeh places Iran on par with its proxies, its protégés.
Additionally, from a broader regional perspective, Tehran increasingly understands that, by the end of this war, its octopus-like network will lose at least one of its arms. Hamas in Gaza will not be able to meet the expectations placed on it by the regime in Tehran. Israel will be freer to deal with the octopus and its other arms and to establish a regional anti-Iran coalition from a position of strength.
The understanding that the first attempt to manage a quasi-state based on “Muslim Brotherhood” principles is doomed to be etched in historical memory as a colossal failure that brought disaster upon many Muslims is what prompted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s militant declaration regarding Israel this week. This realization is also penetrating Iran, as its concern naturally focuses on the implications of this development for the “Axis of Resistance.”
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei threatened that Israel “will be severely punished” for the assassination of Haniyeh. According to a New York Times report, he instructed that Iran should attack Israel directly. Given Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas’s strong desire for revenge against Israel, it is likely that they will make an effort to encourage Iran to retaliate harshly, even if this means taking greater risks than in the past.
Against this backdrop, Nasrallah’s statement on Thursday that “between us, in the coming days and nights, the battlefield will be determined” can be interpreted as a desire to limit the response to a few days of fighting rather than a broad war. However, his remarks pertain solely to Hezbollah’s role, and in any case, Nasrallah also understands that in war, events are uncontrollable and unpredictable.
The Israeli-American cooperation which proved effective during the Iranian attack in April will be beneficial now. The clear statement by the U.S. Secretary of Defense on this matter is welcome. Thwarting the Iranian attack is an interest not only of Israel but also of the United States and other regional countries that fully understand Iran’s intentions regarding them as well.
It is reasonable to assume however that the Iranians will not stop at attacking Israel and will try to target Israeli individuals or institutions abroad. Increasing security and preventive efforts is a necessary step in this regard.
There must also be preparations for the possibility of “quality attacks” within Israel by Hamas or elements directed by Iran’s various proxies. This is also the time to improve defensive measures along Israel’s eastern border.
All these achievements in various arenas over the past 10 months, and Israel’s recent actions, should clarify to Tehran and Beirut not only Israel’s capabilities but also its determination and audacity. Presumably, this will also be taken into account.
Originally published by Israel Hayom.
