Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, where indigenous populations were often uninterested in or unfamiliar with the advantages of a Western-style democracy and, in many cases, harbored deep animosity toward the United States, the Iranian people are widely believed to be overwhelmingly pro-Western and pro-American.
That distinction alone makes the possibility of regime change far more feasible under the right conditions than the misadventures of the early 2000s. A key American miscalculation in those conflicts was the mistaken belief that elections alone constitute democracy. They do not. Without freedom of the press, freedom of speech and a non-sectarian rule of law, the foundations of a state inevitably lead to repression, intimidation and the persecution of minorities, conditions that define the Islamic Republic of Iran today.
There are many layers of complexity to the war unfolding now. Some believe it began in January 2026 or June 2025. In reality, Iran effectively declared war on the United States 47 years ago when it seized American diplomats and held them hostage for 444 days. The pattern of kidnapping, terrorism, killing and persecution has persisted ever since.
Critics argue that this is a war of choice, absent an imminent threat. But as columnist Bret Stephens of The New York Times has argued, the Iran we struck should be understood as the equivalent of a stage-two cancer. Do we wait until that cancer metastasizes into stage four before we deem it an imminent threat?
The same voices who, during the 2015 debate over the nuclear deal with Iran argued that even a nearly completed nuclear device did not constitute urgency until the final screw was turned, now argue Iran posed no meaningful threat to U.S. national security, a claim that is untenable.
Over the past decade, Iran’s enrichment program has advanced to the point where weapons-grade uranium could be produced within weeks, effectively placing it at the threshold of a nuclear weapons state, making it immune to attack. Combined with an expanding ballistic-missile arsenal, this capability would enable Tehran to coerce its neighbors and pursue regional dominance, raising the risk of a wider conflict that would draw in the United States. The question, then, is not whether we should have acted, but why we waited for so long.
Iran has been advancing its military capabilities at an alarming pace. It has pursued hypersonic anti-ship missiles designed to neutralize U.S. carrier groups, alongside advanced Russian and Chinese missile and air-defense systems. It possesses enough 60% enriched uranium for multiple nuclear weapons and is reportedly constructing a deeply buried facility, Pickax Mountain near Natanz that could soon be beyond the reach of even America’s most powerful ordnance.
This war is both regional and global in scope. Iran has long been the nemesis of many U.S. allies in the Middle East, fostering instability through terrorist proxy networks that threaten not only Israel but the broader Arab world. The regime’s record includes the deaths and injuries of thousands of American service members, many targeted by Iranian-supplied improvised explosive devices in Iraq, as well as the funding of groups responsible for attacks on American civilians.
Globally, the way this conflict is concluded will shape perceptions of American resolve. When former President Barack Obama failed to enforce his “red line” on chemical weapons during the Syrian civil war, it opened the door for Russia and Iran to expand their influence in Syria and prop up the regime of Bashar Assad. That moment signaled weakness to adversaries such as China, Russia and Iran, suggesting that American warnings could be ignored without consequence. Peace through inaction is not peace; it is a pathway to decline.
If the Iranian regime is significantly degraded or even collapses, China will take note that American commitments to peace through strength are credible. Russia, too, may reconsider its posture in Ukraine if it perceives renewed American unpredictability and resolve. Moscow’s provision of targeting assistance to Iran, endangering American personnel, will not be forgotten.
Should the United States succeed in assembling an Arab, Asian and European coalition to secure international shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, it would send a powerful message to Beijing, Taipei and the wider world: Freedom of navigation is a global right, and the United States is prepared to lead, provided others who benefit share in the burden. The implications extend directly to the South China Sea.
We are at a critical juncture. How the president chooses to disengage from active military operations will determine whether American deterrence is strengthened or diminished. Done correctly, it could contribute to a more stable and secure world. However, maintaining the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf will require sustained international cooperation for the foreseeable future.
Finally, regime change—the ultimate objective—cannot be expected to unfold on an American timetable. Patience is essential. The Iranian people have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to protest in the millions. If the United States supports them consistently over time, it may ultimately gain not only a new ally in Iran but also renewed credibility and respect across the globe.
This was never a war of choice. The Iranian regime declared hostility toward the United States nearly half a century ago and has acted on it ever since. A clear strategic victory, coupled with the prospect of meaningful regime change, is firmly in America’s national interest.
