Unusual activity of Hamas’s communications network was noted after midnight on the night of Oct. 6, 2023, hours before the Hamas invasion, which began at 6:30 on the morning of Saturday the 7th, but the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) disregarded the activity as insignificant.
At 2:45 a.m. on Oct. 7, Israeli security forces received a report that dozens of SIM cards (necessary for phones to work on a mobile network), were activated in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s Kan News reported on Tuesday.
It was not the first such activation. One took place the night before, on Friday evening at around 9 o’clock. (By Wednesday, Oct. 5, some 45 Hamas communication devices had also been activated).
However, an intelligence summary by the Shin Bet southern region sent to a group of intelligence and political officials dismissed the activity.
“Today and yesterday there were SIMs in certain areas of Gaza. This is not unusual, since similar tests were carried out by Hamas last year as well,” the summary stated.
“According to the division and the command [leadership], Hamas has not changed its routine. The information is preliminary and there are routine activities in Hamas. A discussion on the matter will be held by the Southern Command Intelligence Officer at 08:30 and by the Southern Command heads at 10:00,” it added.
The head of IDF Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, asked, “Are we on alert?” He was answered in the negative, Kan News reported.
The Shin Bet had issued an earlier statement at 1 a.m. on Oct. 7 that also dismissed various indications of a possible attack, Israel Hayom reported.
That intelligence report stated: “A sequence of concerning signs indicates Hamas is preparing for an attack. At the same time, field indicators suggest routine and restraint, with the background of a recently agreed ‘understanding’ leading to the assessment that Hamas is not interested in escalation or starting a campaign at this time.”
Later, however, the agency expressed concern about the possibility of an attack, though of a much smaller scale than what transpired.
Warning at 3:03 a.m.
The Shin Bet issued a warning at 3:03 a.m. on Oct. 7 to the IDF, police and National Security Council, stating: “We have an indication of activation and activity of Hamas’s communication network across several brigades. We lack details on the nature of the activity, though the cumulative unusual activity, alongside additional indicators, may point to an offensive action.”
At about 3:30 a.m., IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi was alerted. He arranged for a situational assessment by phone, which took place 90 minutes later.
Halevi, IDF Operations Directorate head Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk and Finkelman were updated on the signs of an imminent attack. Halevi requested more information. He ordered an update sent to the Israeli Air Force.
The Shin Bet director, Ronen Bar, convened a 4:30 a.m. meeting with regional heads. Possible scenarios covered included a localized surprise raid or kidnapping. Instructions were given to prepare intelligence and operational responses, Israel Hayom reported.
A “Tequila” team composed of Shin Bet fighters and members of the Israel Border Police’s Yamam National Counter-Terrorism Unit, designed to deal with the localized raid scenario, was sent out, according to a recently released internal report by the Shin Bet on its failures to properly respond to the invasion threat.
The Shin Bet report also blamed Israeli government policy from July 2018 until “Operation Guardian of the Walls” in May 2021, which offered economic benefits to restrain Hamas. The agency warned that Hamas was not deterred.
“The investigation demonstrates that the Shin Bet did not underestimate the enemy. On the contrary—there was initiative, pursuit of engagement, and an effort to eliminate the threat at its inception, and yet we failed,” Bar said.
Channel 14 commentator Yaakov Bardugo reported on Wednesday that the Cabinet is expected to convene, read the Shin Bet’s report, and recommend the immediate dismissal of Bar in “disgrace.”
“The document in question reveals a series of professional and moral failures that cannot be rectified,” Bardugo said.
With the release of the report, Bar said, “As the head of the organization, I will bear this heavy burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life. The investigation shows that had the Shin Bet acted differently, both professionally and administratively, in the years leading up to the attack and on the night of the assault, the massacre could have been prevented.”