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Why was Iran not militarily defeated?

Despite the superiority of American arms, a combination of asymmetric strategy, internal cohesion and control over the Strait of Hormuz has prevented a swift defeat of the Islamic Republic.

US Navy Epic Fury
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) sails in the Indian Ocean in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, April 23, 2026. Credit: U.S. Navy.
Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as director general and chief editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority.

The war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which has now entered a temporary pause ahead of fragile negotiations, raises a central question: How is it that a military confrontation with the world’s strongest power has not ended in a clear American strategic victory?

The U.S. wielded overwhelming military force, launching massive airstrikes and deploying sophisticated naval assets. Still, the two primary objectives—reopening the Strait of Hormuz and fully eliminating Iran’s nuclear program—remain unfulfilled.

According to senior security officials, there are several explanations for the survival of the Iranian regime.

First, the constraints of traditional military force. Air and naval superiority no longer ensure decisive victory when the adversary relies on asymmetric tactics.

Iran avoided direct confrontation with the U.S. Instead, it employed attrition tactics and restricted its adversary’s operational latitude.

The primary instrument in this approach was its arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones. These relatively inexpensive, hard-to-intercept weapons have redefined the dynamics of conflict.

They forced the U.S. Navy to maintain a distance from Iranian shores to avoid missile range and made any approach toward Iranian territory a significant risk.

In doing so, Iran effectively offset part of its opponents’ technological edge.

The maritime sphere clearly illustrated this shift. The U.S. Navy failed to impose full control over the Strait of Hormuz and avoided deep offensive operations. Rather than serving as a decisive force, it became primarily a supporting instrument. This represents a conceptual shift, as naval dominance has long been considered a cornerstone of American deterrence.

Second, while the U.S. destroyed Iran’s formal navy, it did not target the small fast boats operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for reasons that remain unclear. These vessels enforce Iran’s de facto ability to threaten, or close, the Strait of Hormuz.

Third, Iran’s capacity to preserve internal unity. Contrary to expectations, the campaign did not trigger collapse or widespread revolt.

Segments of the opposition, including reformists, adopted a protective national stance, recognizing that regime collapse could fracture the state. This undercut one of Washington’s core assumptions for quick pressure.

Large-scale protests that erupted last January, involving tens of thousands of demonstrators, subsided after approximately 35,000 people were reportedly killed by the Basij militia.

The public was both intimidated by the regime and waiting for U.S. President Donald Trump’s cue for renewed protests, per his earlier promises.

Security sources indicate the regime’s handling of earlier protests set a precedent during the war—malevolent security, strong deterrence, and readiness for extreme force kept Iran’s home front stable.

Fourth, Iran has sustained strategic flexibility. It has not yielded on essential issues—its nuclear program or its missile capabilities—and has maintained a policy of ambiguity and pressure.

Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz is now a pivotal tool for exerting economic and security leverage over both the U.S. and the global economy. A decisive outcome is also tied to political constraints. As the campaign dragged on, domestic pressure on Trump within the U.S. mounted, making further escalation more difficult. In these circumstances, even overwhelming military superiority does not guarantee strategic success.

Modern wars are fought at a distance with missiles, drones and other unmanned systems. In this context, even weaker states can deter and avoid rapid defeat.

Fifth, the absence of a large-scale ground operation inside Iran is key. It is extremely difficult to topple a determined authoritarian regime using air power alone.

The conclusion emerging from the war is clear; Iran was not defeated militarily, not because it won, but because it adapted to the new rules of warfare. It combined relatively inexpensive capabilities, strategic thinking, operational flexibility and strict internal control, thereby preventing its adversaries from achieving their objectives.

The key question now is what the next phase holds. For now, the Iranian regime’s sole achievement is survival.

Will economic pressure eventually break Iran? Will Trump’s naval blockade compel surrender? Or will only a blockade plus massive infrastructure strikes suffice? The answer is unclear.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.

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