Iran continues to pose a severe threat to Israel, the Middle East and the world through various means including its nuclear ambitions; support for terrorist proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Houthis; the development of its ballistic missile program; cyber warfare; terrorism; and destabilization efforts around the world.

The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security hosted on Tuesday an online presentation by Dr. Uzi Rubin, an expert on missile defense and the resilience of Israel’s home front, in which he offered his perspective on Iran’s April 13 attack on Israel.

Rubin is also the founder and first director (1991-1999) of the Israel Missile Defense Organization in the Ministry of Defense, which developed, produced and deployed the country’s first national defense shield—the Arrow missile.

Rubin couldn’t promise JNS that Iran today is deterred from carrying out such an attack again.

As Tehran accelerates its nuclear program, and judging by what the Iranians are saying in public, it doesn’t sound like the regime is deterred.

On Tuesday, Iranian interim Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani said that Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre of some 1,200 Israelis had shifted the balance of power in the Middle East “in favor of the resistance” that includes Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and other Iranian-backed terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria.

The Jewish state “should face serious resistance in the region by these resistance groups and also by the nations and peoples in the region,” Bagheri Kani told Newsweek.

On July 2, Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, said Tehran was prepared to launch another attack on the Jewish state, similar to its massive missile and drone strike in April dubbed “Operation True Promise.”

“We await an opportunity for ‘True Promise II’ … in which I do not know how many missiles will be fired,” he said.

Iran’s next attack, said Hajizadeh, “will lead to a complete victory for the Palestinian people.”

In his presentation, titled “True Promise: Iran’s Failed Revenge,” Rubin explained the background of Iran’s attack and the thinking behind it.

On April 1, a building belonging to the Iranian consulate in Damascus was demolished by a precision air attack, apparently during a secret, high level meeting. The strike, attributed to Israel, killed 17 people, among them IRGC Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Iranian Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon.

Zahedi played a central role in the planning and execution of Iran proxy Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack and led the IRGC’s operations out of Syria as the main Iranian contact with Hezbollah.

(The most senior Iranian commander eliminated prior to the strike against Zahedi was Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in Baghdad in a U.S. drone strike in 2020.)

Blaming Israel for Zahedi’s death, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei threatened, “The evil Zionist regime will be punished at the hands of our brave men. We will make them regret this crime and the other ones.”

Iran’s response was an unprecedented and synchronized strike originating from Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and involved a combination of approximately 450 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UAVs.

The attack against Israel targeted Nevatim Air Force Base, Ramon Air Force Base and the Mount Hermon Intelligence Corps Base, and was larger than Russia’s opening salvo against Ukraine in February 2022.

Rubin explained that Iran’s “shock and awe” attack was calculated so that the UAVs and cruise missiles would carry out precision strikes against Israel’s air and missile defenses, the imprecise ballistic missiles would draw and deplete anti-missile fire, and the precise ballistic missiles would destroy key military installations.

Iran’s large attack, according to Rubin, was factored to take into account weather and malfunctions, and the expectation was that 50% of the projectiles would penetrate Israel’s air and missile defenses.

In a display of military might and capability, Israel’s defense apparatus, together with the United States, the United Kingdom, Jordan, France and Saudi Arabia, prevented Iran’s massive aerial bombardment from causing any major damage or disruption.

Of the hundreds of suicide drones and missiles fired at Israel by Iran and its proxies operating out of Yemen, Syria and Iraq, none of the drones or cruise missiles made it through, while just four of the ballistic missiles managed to penetrate Israeli airspace, hitting the Nevatim Air Base near Beersheva.

The sole casualty in the entire onslaught was a young Bedouin girl who was badly injured by shrapnel.

Analyzing the attack

Rubin pointed out that according to media sources, approximately 50% of Iran’s ballistic missiles either failed to launch or fell prematurely. This high rate of ballistic missile failure has been observed in previous Iranian attacks as well.

The IDF Spokesperson at the time said that 99% of the threats were intercepted, but Rubin corrected this, saying this statement is inaccurate. 

According to Rubin, it is more accurate to say that since, whether due to malfunctions or interceptions, only 1% of the threats—four out of more than 400 missiles and drones—reached their target, therefore “99% of the threats failed to do so.”

Even so, Israel’s “Operation Iron Shield” was an “unprecedented achievement” and “unbelievable,” he said.

According to Rubin, the official Iranian rationale was that the Mount Hermon base was responsible for gathering information about the Damascus meeting and Israel’s alleged attack originated from Nevatim and Ramon.

Rubin’s assessment is that “a likely undeclared consideration by Iran is that all three targets are relatively isolated and far from Israel’s main population centers, hence minimizing risk of further escalation due to civilian casualties.”

After Iran’s mass attack, Israel came under pressure from the United States and European nations to refrain from responding.

In response to Iran’s attack, Israel carried out a strike against Iran on April 19, which destroyed parts of the Islamic regime’s Shikari Air Base near Isfahan.

The response was intended to show that Israel could break through Iran’s defense systems undetected.

While the U.S. and Israel view Iran’s attack as a failure, Iran does not see it that way, but rather as an operational success that proved its capability to punch through U.S. and Israeli missile defenses.

Strategically, according to Rubin, Iran views the operation as a watershed event, signaling the end of “Strategic Patience” and its replacement with a policy of direct retaliation against Israel.

In his view, tactically, Israel’s “Operation Iron Shield” was a resounding success of its air and missile defense.

Strategically, he said, it was a resounding U.S. victory, demonstrating both resolve and military might to defend an ally. This action sent a strong message to China with regard to Taiwan, and to Russia with regard to Ukraine.

Rubin noted it was a defensive victory and said that is no less important than an offensive victory.

He pointed to the 1940 Battle of Britain during the Second World War, in which the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy defended the U.K. against large-scale attacks by Nazi Germany’s air force, the Luftwaffe.

He also pointed to the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg, fought between Union and Confederate forces, which Rubin said was a defensive victory for the North and a “pivot point” in the U.S. Civil War. 

Learning the right lessons

Taking a broader perspective, Rubin pointed to Soleimani’s assassination as an example of a lesson that should have been learned and that Israel should have taken into account.

In direct response to Soleimani’s assassination in 2020, Iran launched a series of ballistic missile strikes a week later targeting Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops in Central and Northern Iraq. These strikes, named “Operation Shahid Soleimani,” were seen as a direct retaliation and escalation in the conflict between Tehran and Washington. 

According to Rubin, Iran engaged in this retaliation knowing it risked a full-scale war with the U.S.

The Iranians’ reaction demonstrated that, despite their typically measured approach, the killing of senior officers and generals represents a significant red line for them, prompting a robust and decisive response.

According to Rubin, Iran’s risk-taking “could be explained by its perception that the killing of such high-ranking regime insiders is an unacceptable humiliation.”

He suggested that Jerusalem must take into account that Tehran’s hitherto moderate responses to Israel’s attacks on its interests in Syria “could become extreme in cases where the Iranian regime would perceive a strike as a humiliation.”

When Zahedi was assassinated, analysts speculated on the Islamic Republic’s likely response to the elimination of such a high-ranking military figure. It was anticipated that Iran might opt for a restrained retaliation, possibly through its proxy networks or with a limited direct military strike.

This assessment, as described by Rubin “with some sorrow,” underscores a failure in Israeli governmental circles to heed the lessons from the killing of Soleimani and the subsequent Iranian response.

“I’m sure the elimination of the general [Zahedi] did a lot of good for our cause, but we had to pay a price for it,” Rubin said.

Victory and deterrence

Israel’s defensive victory, as Rubin called it, may have been a success on one level, but from a larger perspective, the question must still be asked: Is Iran deterred from again attacking Israel?

Deterrence “is something you cannot measure. It is something that happens in the enemy’s mind,” he told JNS.

However, he said, deterrence “can be measurable when you’re talking about nuclear threats, because it is the ultimate threat.”

But with regard to conventional threats, he isn’t sure.

“Obviously, the Iranians have also learned a lot from this operation and the military generals were probably somewhat disappointed that the performance was not as good as they expected,” Rubin said. “Are they deterred? Maybe.”

“But most impressive here is that some Arab countries showed themselves to be more afraid of Iran than hostile to Israel.

“I think they have to internalize this message,” Rubin said of the Iranians.