For years, Lebanon has embodied many of the Middle East’s deepest dysfunctions: sectarian fragmentation, economic collapse, an armed terrorist organization holding the country hostage, weak governing institutions, the steady emigration of its most capable citizens and chronic instability. The country that once proudly carried the title of “the Switzerland of the Middle East” has become fertile ground for despair, violence and pessimism.
The United States and other partners gradually distanced themselves from Lebanon, concluding that the country’s grim condition was beyond repair. That, in turn, reinforced a destructive cycle: Lebanon does not receive the assistance it needs, grows weaker and becomes even less attractive to outside partners—with the notable exception of intensified Iranian involvement through the Hezbollah terrorist organization.
Many view the latest war in Lebanon as further evidence of the country’s grim condition. That is a serious misreading. In many respects, Lebanon is facing, for the first time in years, a historic opportunity to change its trajectory for the better.
The main reason is Hezbollah’s current strategic low point, added to the fact that the organization—chiefly responsible for subordinating the Lebanese state to its own agenda—is weaker than it has been in decades. For years, Hezbollah was Lebanon’s kingmaker and, by a wide margin, the most powerful military organization in the country, even when the Lebanese Armed Forces are taken into account. Over time, and especially in recent years, Hezbollah effectively held Lebanon’s political veto, ensuring that the status quo of a “state within a state” would remain intact.
Then came the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and Hezbollah senior leader Hassan Nasrallah’s fateful decision to join in the ensuing war with Israel. That decision triggered a dramatic unraveling: Hezbollah has been severely weakened; Israeli assessments suggest that it has lost the overwhelming majority of its pre-war rocket arsenal; its long-serving leadership was almost entirely eliminated; and the movement’s legendary leader, who had led it since the early 1990s, was replaced by a far less charismatic and far less popular successor.
Much of Lebanon’s Shi’ite community paid a heavy price for Nasrallah’s decision—first and foremost in Southern Lebanon, where hundreds of thousands were forced to leave their homes—but also in Hezbollah’s other strongholds.
Domestically, Hezbollah is more isolated than ever outside the Shi’ite community and is struggling to persuade the Lebanese public that it is defending Lebanon, rather than serving foreign interests. Several factors explain this shift, including changes in Hezbollah’s leadership and the erosion of the fear barrier it long imposed.
In many respects, Lebanon is facing a historic opportunity to change its trajectory for the better.
However, the central factor is its decision to drag Lebanon into war twice in recent years, neither time for the sake of the Lebanese themselves. Polling in recent months has shown clear support among many Lebanese for the state’s monopoly on weapons, indicating a real shift in the position of non-Shi’ite communities toward the organization.
Even Walid Jumblatt, the leader of Lebanon’s Druze community, who over the years was careful to maintain an effective partnership with Hezbollah, stated in late May that Hezbollah had become completely subject to Iranian influence after Nasrallah’s elimination.
This transformation is taking place under regional strategic circumstances that are deeply problematic for Hezbollah, foremost among them the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria and Ahmad al-Sharaa’s rise to power. For years, Syria was Hezbollah’s lifeline, through which much of the organization’s money and many of its weapons passed. In Assad’s absence, and with a president such as al-Sharaa, who fought Hezbollah for years, it has lost a central ally and added another concern to its long list of troubles. The terror organization’s predicament is compounded by uncertainty over the stability and finances of the Iranian regime, on which Hezbollah relies for much of its income.
After years of a governing vacuum created by Hezbollah’s obstruction, Lebanon’s president and prime minister have finally been chosen. For the first time in years, its president, Joseph Aoun, is neither directly identified with Hezbollah nor subordinate to it. The same is true of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Both leaders have issued forceful statements about the need to restore the state’s monopoly on weapons and reduce Iranian influence in the country, and both are taking steps on the ground—within the limits of their power—to advance that goal.
The recent U.S.-brokered framework between Lebanon and Israel underscores that diplomacy is no longer theoretical. Whatever the motive, Beirut now has leadership that is not beholden to Hezbollah.
Within this system lies Lebanon’s deep dependence on the West, creating unique and effective leverage for positive change. By way of illustration, the vast majority of reported foreign aid to Lebanon comes from Western countries and institutions; for military and financial assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the dependence is even greater. In other words, few countries depend so heavily on Western support to keep state institutions functioning as Lebanon.
The situation is far from ideal: Lebanon is still hostage to the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and the road to real progress remains long. Hezbollah is weakened, but it is not finished. It still has weapons, cadres, social institutions and a loyal base, and any rushed confrontation could tear the country apart. The opportunity is not to demand instant victory, but to build a sustained strategy that shifts the balance of power toward the Lebanese state over time.
Nevertheless, a rare opening for change in “Land of the Cedars” could reverberate across the region: disarming one of the world’s most powerful terrorist organizations, reducing Iranian influence, and advancing a peace process between Israel and Lebanon—two countries whose core security dispute could become manageable if Hezbollah’s independent military power is dismantled.
These are ambitious goals, but they are no longer unrealistic. They could change the Middle East for the better and strengthen America’s standing at relatively limited cost. In other words, Lebanon, often treated as a peripheral issue, could become—if managed correctly—a major achievement of American foreign policy.
The situation is far from ideal: Lebanon is still hostage to the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and the road to real progress remains long.
Turning this opening into policy requires a coherent strategy. It should begin by drying up Hezbollah’s sources of power, above all its finances and Iranian support. The first step must be the creation of a dedicated mechanism focused on the Syrian-Lebanese border, aimed at dramatically reducing what remains of the smuggling of money and weapons from Syrian territory.
Actors on both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese border are deeply committed to this mission. This should be combined with an additional effort focused on reforming airports and seaports, ensuring that Iranian diplomats and Hezbollah operatives cannot illegally use them to smuggle money and equipment for the organization, as they have done systematically in the past. Without external assistance, Hezbollah will struggle both to survive and to maintain political loyalty within its community through patronage.
At the same time, the Lebanese Armed Forces need reforms that weaken Hezbollah’s grip on them, while making use of America’s enormous influence over the army. All financial or military assistance to Lebanon should be tied to clear, measurable benchmarks—above all, the army’s effectiveness in enforcing the state’s monopoly on weapons.
Without genuine institutional change and more determined enforcement, progress will remain limited. Where the Lebanese Armed Forces cannot yet act against Hezbollah, Washington should make it clear that Hezbollah’s continued military activity will carry consequences, while ensuring that security measures are tied to a broader strategy that strengthens, rather than bypasses, Lebanese state authority.
The United States can and should also advance diplomatic, political and other efforts to weaken Hezbollah’s political power in Lebanon and strengthen alternative leadership options within the Shi’ite community. In this context, the fact that Amal, the second Shi’ite movement, is led by an 88-year-old leader creates an opportunity to influence the identity of the next leader.
Lebanese Shi’ite politics has not always been synonymous with Hezbollah or Iran, and there is no reason that it must remain so for generations.
The United States must continue pushing forward on the Israel-Lebanon track, building on Washington’s leverage with both sides and the recent diplomatic framework. Such a process has tremendous potential to strengthen America’s standing in the region, stabilize Lebanon, and even turn Israel into a source of direct and indirect assistance to Lebanon.
To that end, Israel should be prepared to offer Lebanon not only pressure but incentives, including defining the conditions whose fulfillment would allow for a gradual reduction of Israel’s ground presence in Southern Lebanon. At the same time, mechanisms for Israeli assistance to Lebanon should already be advanced, with an emphasis on humanitarian, medical and civilian components.
It won’t be easy. It will take time, it will be painstaking, and many aspects will be complicated. But in a Middle East defined by instability, a rare opening is emerging in Lebanon to advance American and Western interests and to improve the lives of millions in Lebanon and across the region, without American boots on the ground or a major new burden on American taxpayers. There are rare moments in history when a door opens to profound and positive change. The United States must not fail to walk through it.
