Peaceful coexistence between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds is possible only under specific political and theological conditions. Current realities make such coexistence difficult.
First, many Western observers misunderstand the conflict because they (naturally) interpret events through the lens of Western secular and post-modern assumptions. They usually fail to appreciate how deeply religion and inherited legal traditions shape political behavior in Muslim societies, leading them to expect agreements, compromises and diplomatic formulas that may not mean the same thing to all sides.
One of the key barriers to peaceful coexistence is the Western concept of permanence. Westerners believe disputes can be permanently settled. The Muslim world does not. Another is the concept of “peace” itself.
Peace is neither automatic nor purely sentimental. The Muslim world does not see the concept of “peace” as a natural state. It is a political achievement requiring realism, institutional reform, cultural understanding and intellectual courage. Lasting harmony between Muslim and non-Muslim societies would require both the reinterpretation of Muslim sources and strategic clarity within non-Muslim societies.
We are not there yet, and given the state of affairs within the Muslim world, we aren’t likely to be in the near future. Coexistence is possible, but only when ideas, incentives and power align.
The Structure of the Muslim World
Territorially, the Muslim world divides the world into two realms: Dar al-Islam (the world where Islam rules) and Dar al-Harb (the world of war, i.e., the world where Islam does not yet rule but will rule eventually). These worlds are in constant conflict and will continue to be until the entire world succumbs to Muslim rule.
Does this imply that all Muslims are united in this fight against the non-Muslim world? Clearly not.
Muslims live in unending conflict with each other. Their differences are based on the social structures in their societies and on unending/unsolvable conflicts between families, clans and ethnic and religious identities. Sunnis, Shi’ites and other sects of Islam, for example, have been engaged in unending battle more or less since the death of their prophet Muhammad in 631 C.E. These internal differences fester right below the surface and have periodically exploded throughout Islamic history.
If Muslims cannot live in peace with each other, how can we expect them to live in peace with non-Muslims?
What matters most in the Muslim world is a show of strength.
Are there individual Muslims who do not accept this view of the world? Certainly, and from my experience, there are many. But these Muslims rarely dare to say so publicly because they fear being assassinated by Muslims who disagree with them.
In practice, any Muslim can declare another Muslim an apostate, the penalty for which in Islam is death. So, Muslims must almost always keep their criticism of Islam private. If word gets out that a Muslim has criticized Islam, he has a target on his back.
Apostates don’t have to be killed instantly. Most Muslim cultures value the concept of patience. Take, for example, the fate of British-American novelist Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses. Rushdie published that book in September 1988. A few months later, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, then the Supreme Leader of Iran, issued a religious decision (fatwa) that Rushdie, who then lived in the United Kingdom, was to be killed because he blasphemed against Islam. Anyone could carry out this sentence. Rushdie went into hiding and rarely appeared in public. When he did, it was under protection.
Western Assumptions
Westerners generally believe that grudges and hatreds mellow with time. Not so in Muslim cultures. How does this apply to Rushdie? Thirty-three years later (in 2022), Rushdie appeared on stage in New York to give a lecture. Suddenly, a (Muslim) man jumped on stage and stabbed him multiple times.
Western policymakers often presume that states and civilizations attach identical meanings to concepts such as diplomacy, treaties, compromise, sovereignty and peace. This leads to recurring policy failures. While Western governments may view a signed agreement as a permanent legal settlement, the Muslim world, by and large, sees such agreements as nothing more than steps towards achieving its own political goals.
If the Western world wants them to sign documents, Muslims will often do so, but their signatures on these pieces of paper are not as sacrosanct as they are in the Western world. The Muslim world may understand them as a contingent arrangement shaped by circumstances and shifting power dynamics.
What matters most in the Muslim world is a show of strength. The Muslim world asks, “Does their opponent/enemy have both the will and the capability to implement the policies they wish?” If the answer to either of these questions is “no,” Muslims sense weakness and often strike.
Leaders will sign almost anything the West wants, but will not necessarily implement what they have agreed to by their signatures.
This is especially important in the treatment of treaties and non-aggression agreements. In an essay examining historical Islamic precedents, I have discussed concepts such as hudna and sulha—forms of truce or negotiated pause rather than final reconciliation. The argument is not that such agreements are insincere or meaningless, but that they have historically been understood in more pragmatic and temporary terms than the modern Western ideal of irreversible peace.
Many in Europe and North America assume that a signed agreement marks the definitive end of conflict. By contrast, history suggests that in certain Islamic political traditions, agreements have often been judged primarily by whether they serve current interests and preserve strategic advantage. The framework is not cynical so much as it is different, and failing to recognize that difference is itself a form of cultural incomprehension.
‘Dar al-Islam’ and ‘Dar al-Harb’
The classical division of the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb is one expression of this difference. These realms, in traditional Islamic political theology, exist in a state of ongoing tension until the entire world comes under Muslim governance. This does not mean all Muslims are united in active hostility towards non-Muslims.
These fault lines do not vanish in the face of an external adversary; they persist, complicate and often overwhelm any united front. But the internal fragmentation strongly suggests sobriety about the prospects of durable external peace.
The attack on Rushdie exemplifies the value of patience in many Muslim societies, instilling a persistent atmosphere of fear; a condition hardly conducive to the kind of social trust on which we in the West believe genuine peace depends.
From this perspective, coexistence may indeed occur in practice without necessarily reflecting deep philosophical harmony. Periods of calm, commercial exchange, military restraint and diplomatic coordination are entirely possible. States may trade, cooperate on security and maintain order for extended periods while still preserving profound underlying disagreements.
But there is a distinction between the absence of war and the presence of genuine reconciliation; Western policymakers frequently conflate the two. A ceasefire, normalization agreement or pragmatic partnership may reduce violence and improve conditions, yet still fall short of what the West sees as a shared moral vision of peace. This does not negate such arrangements; it simply requires realism about their limitations and their foundations.
‘Shalom’ and ‘Salaam’
“Peace” in English and shalom in Hebrew have roughly the same meaning: letting bygones be bygones or starting anew.
The Arabic salaam is something different. It means, roughly, the joy that one gets by submitting to Allah’s will. Both salaam and “Islam” come from the same Arabic root (SLM), which means “submission.”
Is that what we want to have with Muslims? Peace and shalom are based on the equality of all human beings. But Islam doesn’t see non-Muslims as equals. Classic Islamic texts make it clear that the purpose of the state is to safeguard and promote Islam. The words used are “to command good and eradicate evil.”
Non-Muslims with a revelation from God before the advent of Islam—most notably Jews and Christians—can live in a Muslim state, but they must always remember that their place is at best as second-class/inferior residents of the state. Non-Muslims are not equal.
Two examples:
First, pre-Islamic Revolutionary Iran: In Persian, there is a word, khareji, which, in dictionaries, is almost always translated as “foreigner.” But during my time in Iran, I had numerous discussions about the meaning of the word khareji. I learned that it has a much deeper meaning than the English word “foreigner.” Probably a better way to describe the word is “outsider.”
I asked people to explain what the word meant to them. I gave two examples: What about Shi’ite Muslims from Afghanistan who moved to Iran? Are they kharejis? Could their descendants become Iranian within a generation or maybe two? And what about Jews who had been living in Iran for more than 2,600 years? Were they Iranian or “kharejis”? The overwhelming response was that any Muslim, especially a Shi’ite, would be accepted as an Iranian. But regarding Jews whose ancestors had lived in Iran from time immemorial, the answers were confused. Most thought that only Muslims could be true Iranians.
Second, the status of non-Muslims under Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey: The Ottoman Empire, whose existence was intended to further Islam, was an identity defined by a religio-political group. Jews or Christians might be advisors to the regime, but they could never rule that country. In Atatürk’s so-called “secular and democratic” Turkey, everyone was supposed to be called a “Turk,” and all citizens were supposed to be equal.
But were they? Judging by their fate and those of their fellow Muslims, they weren’t.
Under Atatürk’s successor, Turkey instituted the varlik vergisi, roughly meaning “property tax,” primarily geared toward non-Muslims. In practice, it was an extremely onerous burden, which large numbers of Jews and Christians could not afford to pay. So, Turkey sent these non-Muslims out to labor camps in the east under horrible conditions, where many died.
So-called “peace agreements” between Muslims and non-Muslims are in that same category. They are temporary accommodations at best.
Durable diplomacy
Durable diplomacy requires understanding how Muslim societies understand peace, justice and legitimacy. When they use those words, they are not thinking of those concepts as we do in the West. If negotiators assume semantic equivalence where none exists, they risk misreading intentions and overestimating the permanence of agreements. Peace cannot be built on translation alone; it must rest on a genuine comprehension of the political culture of the Islamic world.
So, must there be unending conflict between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds? Is there a way “to square the circle” and use Islamic sources to make an argument whereby Muslim and non-Muslim coexist as equals?
Islam doesn’t see non-Muslims as equals.
There are two ways to answer this question:
First, the Big Boss Theory: The first way would be to posit that non-Muslims show Muslims who is the boss and who makes the rules of how the groups will interact. Non-Muslims would have to have the resolve and fortitude to make Muslims comply and demonstrate both the will and the ability to do what is necessary to make Muslims comply. The problem with this approach is that it requires non-Muslims to be on guard at all times.
This is untenable in the long run. First, there is the patience referred to above. Muslims constantly probe to detect weakness in non-Muslims. When they find it, they strike.
Over the past 200 years or so, non-Muslims have not had the fortitude to continue to be vigilant. Moreover, the Western world generally does not want to be in the position of imposing its will on others. We see (in principle, at least) everyone as equal and do not want to compromise on that principle.
So, it won’t work.
Second, encouragement and alliances: encourage those Muslims who want to coexist with non-Muslims as equals and who warn that continued conflict risks awakening a sleeping giant that could ultimately destroy them. This is unusual because we rarely hear those people speaking up. They know that if they speak up, they would be declared apostates and become targets for assassination.
In my personal experience, I have met many such Muslims over more than 60 years. Many have been engaged for a long time in searching their abundant sources to find ways to reinterpret the Quran, the Hadith and other vast numbers of sources in ways that can support getting along with non-Muslims.
However, today, they simply do not have the power to take over Islamic institutions and thinking by themselves. The only way this could happen is if the non-Muslims inflict a catastrophic defeat on the Muslim world. It must be a defeat in which the Muslim world is left in tatters. Then, and only then, might this happen. Would the major powers of the non-Muslim world be prepared to do this? It probably would depend on what Muslims do to provoke the wrath of non-Muslims.
Until then, we are at a standstill.
Conclusion
The Muslim world now sees the West as weak and unwilling to stop it from overwhelming us. Part of the reason is Western tolerance for Islamic radicalism in Europe and, less so, in the United States.
The choice is ours. Do we have the will and capability to ensure that our Western civilization survives? Or are we doomed to eternal war?
There are many Muslims who believe that they have agency in this. They know how to reinterpret their sources and are mostly doing so quietly.
Consider the United Arab Emirates.
At a conference a few years ago UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Abdallah ben Zayid al-Nahyan summed it up best and in English: “There will come a day when we will see far more radical extremists and terrorists coming out of Europe because of lack of decision-making, trying to be politically correct or assuming that they know the Middle East and that they know Islam and that they know the others better than we do. And … I am sorry. That’s pure ignorance.”
We should take the foreign minister’s words to heart. He knows what he is up against, far better than we do. We should follow his lead.
Originally published by the Jewish Policy Center.
