As the Nov. 27, 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire expires, there are many questions about the next steps in Southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army is delaying its mission to take control of the area south of the Litani River, and Israel has made clear that it will not withdraw its forces from Southern Lebanon as long as Hezbollah outposts remain in the area.
Lack of motivation to resume hostilities
It appears, at least superficially, that Hezbollah’s current motivation to resume hostilities against Israel is low. The organization has been undergoing a process of self-examination in light of its defeat in the campaign it initiated against Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, as an act of solidarity with Hamas’s barbaric “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack the day before.
The Shi’ite organization is trying to broadcast an image of a glorious victory, but with its mythical leader Hassan Nasrallah eliminated by Israel, along with the lion’s share of the organization’s command and some 2,500 of its field operatives, the boasting about the great defeat of the “Zionist enemy” rings hollow. It is a facade for domestic consumption, and nothing more.
Internalizing the dramatic extent of the damage to Hezbollah
Hezbollah acknowledges that the vast arsenal of weapons it had amassed, both defensive and offensive, has been substantially eroded by Israel. This includes substantial damage to its order of battle, and the array of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles that had been cultivated and maintained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, both as a means of deterrence and as an Iranian front line for maintaining a “second strike” capability against Israel.
Prior to the decimation of Hezbollah’s arsenal, the extraordinary Israeli intelligence operation of Sept. 17, 2024, involving the simultaneous explosion of thousands of pagers used by members of Hezbollah’s headquarters and field ranks, was the beginning of the undermining of its status as the main military entity in Lebanon.
The collapse of the Shi’ite “axis of evil”
The most severe of the many blows Hezbollah suffered was the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. For many years, the Alawite Syrian regime played a central role in preserving the Shi’ite “axis of evil” in both logistical and ideological terms, with the goal of maintaining Hezbollah as an active arm against Israel. In addition, the dramatic damage Israel inflicted on Iran in the reciprocal attack of Oct. 26, 2024, dramatically accelerated the undermining of Tehran’s grip and regional aspirations, particularly in Lebanon.
Lebanese sources have noted that President Bashar Assad’s relations with Hezbollah and even with the Iranians had cooled even before Oct. 7, 2023. Assad was interested in reducing the Iranians’ scope of action in Syrian territory, as well as in limiting Hezbollah’s activity in his country. It is possible that the clock had already begun to tick toward the disintegration of the “axis of evil.” The possibility cannot be ruled out that covert Israeli contact with Assad through an internet communication channel, the existence of which was recently made public, was a factor in accelerating the unraveling of the Shi’ite axis.
Hezbollah searches its soul
What is Hezbollah’s leadership pondering at this difficult time? They’re not thinking about establishing a commission of inquiry, of course. First and foremost, Hezbollah has to analyze why the war had such disastrous results from its perspective. It will have to consider the security breaches that allowed Israel to penetrate its frameworks so deeply, and redesign its strategic approach to continuing the conflict with Israel. This will require tackling dilemmas concerning both the rebuilding of its military force and the training of new fighters. The group will also have to formulate a plan to rebuild the civilian environment in southern Lebanon, where there is a traditional Shi’ite majority.
The search for a way forward
Hezbollah’s top brass cannot ignore growing voices within the organization advocating a new approach that stresses the movement’s Lebanese identity. If adopted, such an approach could mean a reduction of the organization’s traditional dependence on Iran and more practical and substantial integration into domestic Lebanese politics.
There is no doubt that the election of Joseph Aoun as president after a prolonged governmental vacuum, and the placement of Nawaf Salam as a leading candidate for prime minister, intensify the constraints on Hezbollah’s path in Lebanon. They also constitute a ringing slap in the face for Iran.
A time of opportunity for the moderate Sunni axis
Iran’s current weakness in the Middle East lays the foundation for the promotion of a pragmatic Sunni axis led by Saudi Arabia, with Lebanon potentially the first test case of that geostrategic change.
Although it is too early to eulogize Hezbollah as an influential sub-state organization in Lebanon, it seems that President-elect Aoun’s ambitions to implement “one army for one state” and, by implication, disarming Hezbollah with international support give strong signals about the group’s future. It can be cautiously estimated that it will never again be what it once was.
Constraints on Hezbollah
The Western powers’ involvement, particularly the leading role of the United States in shaping the face of a renewed Lebanon, will likely serve as a barrier to Hezbollah’s radical wing, which has not abandoned its aspiration of reestablishing its military power as well as Iranian influence in Lebanon.
Still, for the time being, it is unlikely that Hezbollah will renew fire on Israel. This is undoubtedly a manifestation of the remarkable blow the IDF dealt to the organization, which until recently was considered the most powerful terrorist army in the world.
Originally published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.