Shadow ruler, billionaire and gatekeeper to Iran’s supreme leader— these are some of Mojtaba Khamenei’s titles. Khamenei appears simultaneously to be a militant conservative, a pragmatic intellectual, a candidate for supreme leader and a presidential hopeful.
This week, in the wake of an Israeli Air Force attack on Iran, discussion about him reached American shores. In an analysis piece in The New York Times, veteran journalist Steven Erlanger wrote of an emerging succession struggle in Tehran, noting that 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may be seriously ill.
Within Iran’s clerical establishment, there is restlessness, and many are increasingly mentioning that the leader’s second-oldest son, 55-year-old Mojtaba, may one day succeed him.
Arab media recently posited that Iran faces two paths forward after the Israeli attack: a diplomatic settlement with the West, or a race toward nuclear weapons, risking a broad regional confrontation. Proponents of diplomacy pin hopes on Mojtaba, seeing him as a potential “architect of change.”
Key factor: The Revolutionary Guard
“Mojtaba’s gradual rise has allowed him to build influence within the regime’s framework,” wrote Lebanese journalist Nadim Koteish in an article in the Saudi-owned, London-based pan-Arab Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.
“He is known for his strong ties with the Revolutionary Guard and for his strategic influence behind the scenes, as well as his involvement in managing Iran’s vast assets, estimated to be between $100 billion-$200 billion under his father’s control.”
A researcher in the Persian Gulf assessed Mojtaba’s personal wealth at around $3 billion, mostly held in banks in the U.K. and other countries.
Koteish emphasized: “Mojtaba’s absolute loyalty to the regime’s ideological core is coupled with a pragmatic grasp of geopolitical realities. His role gained importance following the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi, with the accession of current President Masoud Pezeshkian, and his oversight of the signs of change Pezeshkian brings.”
The sudden end of Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash last May, wasn’t the only development that benefited Mojtaba. The 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, removed a significant rival.
Both men were prominent candidates to succeed Khamenei Sr., with Raisi holding substantial experience and higher religious standing, while Soleimani had become a symbol in his lifetime and was considered nearly an adopted son by Khamenei.
Koteish lists Mojtaba’s advantages: “His influence within the Revolutionary Guard makes him a stabilizing figure, bolstering his negotiating position if he chooses to lead internal and regional negotiations. His strong ties with senior military and security figures grant him credibility to ensure the support of Iran’s zealous base during a potential transition.”
“As the son of the supreme leader, he is viewed as a symbol of ideological continuity for the revolutionary regime, potentially giving him unique authority to enact reforms aimed at the system’s adaptation and sustainability.
“Additionally, at age 55, he is seen as part of a younger generation in an aging regime, which theoretically endows him with flexibility and an understanding of Iran’s internal pressures and the impacts of international isolation. This could help him win support from a younger generation frustrated by Iran’s stagnant state.”
However, many in Iran are fundamentally averse to any suggestion of a hereditary monarchy, especially if leadership passes from father to son. Perceived as inseparable from the ruling elite, Mojtaba’s image is marred by doubts that he could lead real change. Some view him as an extremist, no less committed than his father to Israel’s destruction.
The fighter who returned from the desert
Mojtaba was born in 1969 in Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest city, as the second son of a prominent Shiite cleric who would later become Iran’s leader and one of his many teachers.
Before the late 1970s revolution against the shah’s regime, Mojtaba and his three brothers witnessed their father’s violent arrests. After Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s rise to power, the family moved to Tehran, and their socioeconomic status improved dramatically as Ali Khamenei was appointed to numerous positions, including deputy defense minister.
Mojtaba came of age during the brutal 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. At 19, he joined the battle in Iraq’s southern deserts with an Iranian battalion called Habib ibn Mazaher. The extent of his combat participation is unclear. While some accounts describe him as fighting heroically, these claims should be viewed with caution.
It is known, however, that Mojtaba didn’t enjoy any special privileges due to being the son of Khamenei, then president of Iran. But he forged alliances with fighters and commanders who were later appointed to senior positions, forming a coalition of politicians, clerics and officers in the Revolutionary Guard.
The most prominent among them was Hossein Taeb, who would later head the organization’s intelligence wing. Another ally was Hassan Mohakek, Mojtaba’s battalion commander, who later became deputy head of intelligence. A few years after his recruitment, Mojtaba was summoned back to Tehran by his father.
Western sources report that Mojtaba married twice under “temporary marriage” arrangements—a practice endorsed by Khomeini—which allows relations with a woman without long-term commitment and, often, against her will.
Later, Mojtaba entered a more politically strategic marriage with the daughter of the then-parliament speaker, now one of Khamenei Sr.’s advisers. The couple traveled several times to the U.K. for fertility treatments, eventually having two sons and a daughter.
At first glance, Mojtaba would not seem a natural successor. His older brother, Mustafa, 59, holds the title of ayatollah, granted to Shi’ite scholars who complete advanced Islamic studies.
Unlike Mojtaba, Mustafa has significant religious authority, and he also fought in the Iran-Iraq War. Despite his studies in Qom, Mojtaba never achieved extensive religious authority and lacks an edge over his brother beyond his political ambitions.
Yet both suffer from a similar problem. Khomeini spoke out against hereditary leadership. Even Ali Khamenei, at least publicly, has opposed it.
However, if Mojtaba is gradually incorporated into the leadership and chosen by the Assembly of Experts, the transition may be accepted. Not coincidentally, Mojtaba is considered a senior official in his father’s office. Since his father’s appointment, Mojtaba’s standing has steadily risen.
Since the 1990s, he has been involved in political and security affairs. Veterans of the Iran-Iraq War surrounded him, taking security positions. This circle is suspected of influencing election outcomes in Iran. Thus, his influence is widely noted in the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence agency and the Basij militia, responsible for suppressing protests.
However, these associations have made him a controversial figure—a potential top leader, but one deeply loathed by both Iranian opposition figures and certain establishment politicians.
The puppet master
A leaked British memo to the U.S. Department of State, published via WikiLeaks, described him as follows: “The son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, considered within the regime as a powerful figure and skilled manager, perhaps destined to inherit at least part of the national leadership.”
The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on Mojtaba. These sanctions targeted the Iranian military’s General Staff and nine people appointed or acting on behalf of Iran’s leader.
In short, Mojtaba is not just a national politician but also an influential regional figure, affecting Arab capitals and Shi’ite militias funded and guided by Soleimani’s network.
Iran International recently reported that in a secret Revolutionary Guard meeting, Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Aerospace Forces, praised Mojtaba’s role in funding the drone program and missile development, the same network reportedly targeted by Israel last week.
During this meeting, a senior official praised Mojtaba’s military expertise, while Mojtaba seized the opportunity to criticize Raisi’s government for “bringing the country to an impasse.”
It seems Mojtaba’s influence in Iran extends nearly everywhere, from media appointments to university operations across the Islamic Republic, and he is certainly involved in decisions related to regional conflicts with Israel and the nuclear project negotiations with the West.
But like Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Mojtaba Khamenei’s true test will come upon his father’s death, when he will face either removal from power—or a long-term hold on Iran’s leadership.
Originally published by Israel Hayom.
