Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has opened the door to a relationship of considerable strategic importance, particularly given Somaliland’s position on the Gulf of Aden, near the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
It is understandable that both governments want to turn this diplomatic breakthrough into practical cooperation. However, one area they should approach with particular care is livestock.
What looks like a straightforward opportunity for Israeli agricultural or veterinary expertise could create political sensitivities around a trade relationship Somaliland cannot afford to lose.
The issue is no longer entirely hypothetical. Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi and Israel’s Minister of Economy Nir Barkat discussed ways to modernize and expand livestock exports during their meeting in June 2026, although the official statement did not announce a specific veterinary project.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia, which currently has no diplomatic relations with Israel, has explicitly opposed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and continues to support Somalia’s territorial integrity while remaining a major destination for Somaliland’s livestock.
This is not a minor issue. A 2026 study using data from Somaliland’s Ministry of Planning and National Development found that livestock accounted for approximately 75% of the country’s exports in 2024.
Somaliland’s investment portal cites a historical export breakdown showing that 78% of livestock shipped through Berbera went to Saudi Arabia, compared with 20% to Yemen.
Although these destination percentages are historical rather than verified current figures, they illustrate the longstanding concentration of Somaliland’s livestock trade in the Saudi market.
Therefore, a partnership intended to strengthen Somaliland should take seriously the possibility that highly visible Israeli involvement in veterinary products, quarantine procedures or export certification could become politically sensitive for either Saudi buyers or regulators.
The concern is not that Riyadh would punish Somaliland simply because Israel decided to recognize it. It’s whether Saudi authorities or Saudi livestock importers might respond differently if Israeli companies became directly involved in the veterinary treatment, testing or certification of animals destined for their market.
There is currently no verified evidence that such objections have been made. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s official import requirements include permits, vaccination documentation and health certificates, making it important to establish whether proposed changes to veterinary procedures would be acceptable to Saudi regulators and purchasers before they are introduced.
Somaliland knows what restricted market access can mean, with a peer-reviewed study estimating some $770 million in cumulative losses over five years from earlier Saudi livestock import restrictions imposed due to animal health concerns.
Those events were unrelated to Israeli recognition, but they illustrate why even an avoidable interruption to this trade could carry consequences far beyond the port of Berbera, especially for pastoralists and rural households.
We should not assume that political disagreement necessarily prevents practical cooperation. Saudi private capital is reportedly involved alongside Taiwanese and American investors in a new livestock quarantine development near Berbera.
That suggests that Somaliland’s existing commercial connections can continue despite diplomatic disagreements. Israel should regard those connections as something to protect rather than as obstacles to a new partnership.
A more prudent approach would be for Somaliland to consult its exporters and quarantine operators and use existing trade channels to seek clarification from Saudi livestock importers and veterinary authorities before introducing Israeli products or systems into Saudi-bound exports.
Meanwhile, Israel could begin by supporting veterinary training, laboratory capacity and disease surveillance without requiring that Israeli technology be a visible part of export certification. Such cooperation should be transparent, consistent with importing-country rules and paced according to Somaliland’s judgment.
Neither government should treat a decision to postpone a sensitive project as a lack of commitment to the relationship.
For Israel, the larger issue is diplomatic rather than commercial, because a strong partner near the Red Sea is more valuable when it remains economically secure and free to maintain its existing relationships.
If cooperation with Somaliland is to become a lasting strategic success, it should expand Somaliland’s options rather than make it choose between a new diplomatic ally and the customers on whom much of its export economy still depends.