Israel’s northern border is not one front. It is two very different arenas, and they cannot be treated the same way.
Lebanon and Syria both pose serious security challenges to Israel, but the nature of those challenges is fundamentally different. In Lebanon, the main problem is clear: Hezbollah. In Syria, the challenge is broader, more unstable and still unresolved. That is why a framework agreement may be possible with Lebanon, while with Syria, it is still premature.
In Lebanon, Israel knows what it is dealing with. The Lebanese state is weak, its army is limited, and Hezbollah operates as a state within a state. The question is not whether there is a threat. The question is how to push that threat back from the border and ensure that it stays there.
That clarity makes a framework agreement at least conceivable. The key issues are concrete: Will Hezbollah be removed from Southern Lebanon? Will the Lebanese army take responsibility? Will there be supervision and enforcement? These are difficult questions, but they are specific ones. Israel does not need illusions about Lebanon. It needs a mechanism that can be tested against reality.
Syria is a different story.
Syria is not facing a single armed actor. It is a country that has been shattered by years of civil war, institutional collapse, Iranian entrenchment, Russian influence, militia activity, jihadist groups and deep internal mistrust. Even after the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime, the central question is not simply who sits in Damascus. It is whether that leadership can actually control southern Syria.
That matters because a security agreement is only meaningful if the side signing it has the ability to enforce it. A paper arrangement is not enough if the south remains vulnerable to militias, extremists, local strongmen or outside powers seeking to exploit the vacuum.
As someone who commanded “Operation Good Neighbor” on the Syrian border for years, I learned that southern Syria is not just a military map. It is villages, clans, minorities, fears, grievances and fragile local structures. In such an environment, a security vacuum can quickly become a strategic threat. Israel must therefore be careful not to confuse hopeful rhetoric with operational reality.
That is why the right Israeli approach toward Syria is not a broad peace agreement at this stage. It is a gradual security arrangement, built step by step and verified on the ground.
The first need is a coordination mechanism that reduces the risk of misunderstandings and military friction. The next need is a practical commitment to prevent Iranian forces, proxy militias and jihadist groups from entrenching themselves in southern Syria.
Later, if conditions truly improve, there may be room for a supervised buffer zone, protection for minorities and even limited civilian cooperation in areas such as aid, water, health, agriculture and reconstruction.
But that is the point: later.
Israel should not rush into a broad agreement with Syria before the basic facts on the ground are clear. Premature legitimacy could strengthen a regime before it has demonstrated stability, responsibility or control. A rushed deal could end up rewarding promises rather than results.
This is especially important given the character of Syria’s new leadership. If the man in charge emerged from the world of jihad, Israel cannot judge him by words alone. The real test is behavior. Can he keep jihadist groups out of the south? Can he prevent Iranian entrenchment? Can he protect minorities? Can he stop the border from becoming a launchpad for future violence?
Those are the questions that matter, not the slogans.
Israel should also recognize that Syria’s interests and Israel’s interests are not identical, but they overlap. A Syria that wants sovereignty cannot allow itself to become an Iranian corridor or a battlefield for extremist groups. Yet Israel cannot rely on declarations. It must insist on verifiable outcomes.
That is why the comparison with Lebanon is so important. In Lebanon, the threat is identifiable, and the objective is limited: Weaken Hezbollah, push it back and enforce a new reality near the border. In Syria, the challenge is not one organization but an unstable political and security landscape that may not yet be ready for a serious agreement.
Israel should therefore treat Lebanon and Syria with different tools. In Lebanon, a framework agreement may be the right instrument. In Syria, the right policy is caution, phased coordination and strict verification.
For Israel, caution is not hesitation. It is strategy. In Lebanon, a framework agreement can be built around a known threat. In Syria, the state itself is still too unsettled to support one.
