While we don’t know the full details of the deal that Trump administration negotiators made with the Islamic Republic of Iran, an agreement that would stop the military and economic pressure on Iran in exchange for a single gesture of opening the Strait of Hormuz suggests the following: First, U.S. President Donald Trump is impatient and much more eager to have a deal than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and therefore, would make more concessions to the Iranians than the outcome of the conflict requires.
After all, the United States and Israel inflicted heavy blows on the Iranians and, under normal conditions, would behave as victors who dictate the terms of the agreement.
Second, it can be assumed, with a high degree of certainty, that the Iranian people were not given any consideration regarding the deal to be signed in Switzerland. By virtue of conducting negotiations with this regime, as equal parties, the Trump administration has conferred legitimacy upon a group of mullahs that is not only repressive toward its own people but is a global terror-sponsoring entity that will remain a threat to the United States, Europe, and especially, the State of Israel.
Third, as a significant U.S. partner in the war against Iran, Israel’s security interests have apparently not been considered by the United States—not in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (already electronically signed by Trump and Vice President JD Vance), nor in the release of a copy of the document to the Israelis. Israel’s security interests were further compromised by Trump’s insistence, at the behest of Iran and Turkey, that Israel end its operations in Beirut, thus ensuring the continued presence of Hezbollah (Iran’s major proxy) in Lebanon. Most recently, Trump suggested that Syria, rather than Israel, be put in charge of fighting Hezbollah.
Clearly, Trump is under pressure to sign a deal to secure the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, which, it is assumed, will bring energy costs down and perhaps reduce supermarket prices. His advisers consider these factors as conditions for success in the upcoming November midterm elections.
For Trump, however, the question is whether he wants to be remembered as the leader who ended the Iranian nuclear threat and secured a much better deal than the 2015 deal orchestrated by former President Barack Obama, which enabled the Iranian regime to come dangerously close to a nuclear bomb, or as the one who signed an even worse agreement when the ayatollahs were at their weakest?
The MoU between Washington and Tehran calls for a 60-day ceasefire with a possible 90-day extension. It would tie the hands of the Israel Defense Forces from operating against Hezbollah and the Houthis, should they fire missiles at Israel. The benefits for Trump and international commerce would be the opening of the Strait to the free flow of commerce; however, the key issues that compelled Washington and Jerusalem to wage military operations against Iran, including limiting its ballistic-missile production and ending Iran’s support of its terrorist proxies, are not expected to be on the negotiating table.
Two successful Israeli-American military operations have destroyed significant portions of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, ballistic-missile capabilities and drone programs. Still, Iran has an appreciable arsenal of lethal missiles that have survived the attacks.
Having not surrendered, the regime now led by Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei may yet claim to be victorious, especially since the IRGC is in place, and the regime is already showing signs of further radicalization. The IRGC, which effectively controls Iran and Supreme Leader Khamenei, understands that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is what can provide the country with a true “insurance policy” and, therefore, will do everything possible to achieve that objective.
Whatever the Iranian regime may sign, especially with regard to the nuclear issue, will simply be considered a temporary measure that might be in force until Trump leaves the White House or maybe even before his departure. Just as it has done in the past, it will surreptitiously rebuild its nuclear program. It is unlikely that Trump, despite his bold declarations about how “Iran will not have a nuclear weapon,” would wage another attack at this point.
In the 60 days following the signing of the MoU, the parties will negotiate the nuclear issue. Each side will interpret these provisions as it sees fit and claim victory. We are already witnessing this through Iranian statements regarding the agreement’s 14 principles and American responses dismissing those claims as “fake news.” Yet no one will be surprised if Trump capitulates and endorses those provisions. In any case, it’s difficult to believe that a good agreement will emerge from future negotiations.
While Trump was in a keen mood to punish the Iranian regime that sought to assassinate him, he relented, allowing his close advisers—namely, Vance, Steve Witkoff, and son-in-law Jared Kushner—to persuade him to moderate his position in consideration of American domestic priorities. Pressure also came from the Arab Gulf states, particularly Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to end the military operations. The Pentagon, moreover, counseled Trump that bringing down the regime and IRGC might take months, which would impact the midterms this fall.
Should the agreement provide the Iranian regime with sanctions relief and unfreeze the Iranian assets, in exchange for opening the Strait of Hormuz, while postponing all other critical matters to future negotiations, it would be a critical mistake. The Iranians would, no doubt, drag out the negotiations to impact the American midterms, while fortifying the regime’s survivability.
