Israel’s historic attack on Iran in the early hours of June 13, 2025 should serve as a reminder that the Jewish state is a formidable actor in the Middle East, highlighting its critical role in countering regional threats and creating stability and prosperity. In 2020, four countries—Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Sudan—recognized this and signed the landmark Abraham Accords normalization agreements with Israel. Many anticipated that Saudi Arabia would soon join the accords, but unforeseen challenges stalled this historic opportunity.
Hamas’s brutal surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, raised fears that the normalization had been derailed. But experts say the path to normalization is still viable, albeit significantly altered by war, politics and public perception.
Former Israeli National Security Adviser Meir Ben Shabbat insisted that Riyadh’s strategic interests remain consistent. “Saudi Arabia’s fundamental interest in establishing relations with Israel has not changed,” Ben Shabbat told JNS. “It will be difficult for it to do so while a war is ongoing, but that doesn’t mean it has backed away from this goal.”
Now the head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, Ben Shabbat emphasized that Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculus is shaped not only by its national interests but also by a shared desire to see Hamas, and by extension the Muslim Brotherhood, eliminated as a regional force.
“Even if it does not declare it publicly, Saudi Arabia certainly wants Israel to defeat Hamas,” he said.
When Israel does defeat Hamas, it is clear that normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will be back on the table, he added. Although the four countries have already normalized relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia’s recognition would signify a complete overturning of the 1967 Khartoum Resolution’s “three nos” regarding the Jewish state (no peace, no recognition, no negotiations).
Enia Krivine, senior director of the Israel Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, agrees that normalization remains in play—but said it no longer follows the route it once did.
“Saudi normalization with Israel is on track, but it’s not on the same track as it was during the last Trump administration,” Krivine told JNS. “Israel was very close to clinching a deal in 2020. However, Biden’s decision to reset U.S.-Saudi relations ground the normalization process to a halt.”
Today, the process has resumed, but under far different circumstances. “After over a year and a half of the war that Hamas launched, and that has been disastrous for the people of Gaza, the picture is much more complicated,” she said. “Normalization is on track, but it’s a different track than it was in 2020.”
So when might the normalization train get moving again?
According to Krivine, Israel must bring the war in Gaza to a close—and do so in a way that delivers a clear win both for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).
As Krivine noted, Netanyahu has expressed that he “is not willing to lose the war against Hamas in order to gain normalization with Saudi Arabia.”
“To move forward with normalization, Israel has to wrap up the war in Gaza and provide MBS with some kind of concession that MBS can sell to his public as a ‘win,’” Krivine explained. “Netanyahu has to be able to sell his public on a ‘win’ in Gaza before he can offer MBS a concession that the Saudi leader can market domestically as a concession from the Israelis.”
Until then, the process is effectively paused.
“Normalization remains on track,” she said, “but the normalization train is stalled.”
One of the key variables in this equation is the Palestinian issue—a long-standing diplomatic stumbling block that took on new urgency in the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks and the subsequent Gaza war.
“The Palestinian issue is relevant for the Muslim world,” said Krivine. “MBS is a shrewd leader, and he has made a decision—based on the political reality of the moment—that he has to include the Palestinians into his thinking vis-a-vis normalization with Israel.”
While in 2020 Palestinian concerns appeared to be sidelined in the Saudi-Israel talks, the situation is different now, she said. Whether MBS’s shift is rooted in conviction or strategy is unknown, but it reflects a recalibration of political priorities.
The IDF had recovered evidence in Gaza that one of the reasons that then-Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar chose to launch the attack on Israel when he did is that Sinwar understood that MBS was inclined to make a deal with the United States and Israel that would have left Palestinians out in the cold,” she told JNS.
In that sense, the war—and Hamas’s gamble—did succeed in freezing a historic opportunity, at least temporarily. “Sinwar is certainly enjoying watching from his grave as this historic opportunity for peace gets put on ice until the messy war that he masterminded is resolved,” Krivine added.
Both Ben Shabbat and Krivine agreed: the path to normalization is still open, but it is no longer fast, simple, or guaranteed.
Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States remain aligned with regard to strategic interests—but domestic politics, war dynamics and regional perceptions now play a far greater role than they did five years ago.
However, while the normalization train may have stalled, it has not been derailed. Once Israel achieves its goals in Gaza and Iran, Israel can expect to see a renewal of negotiations toward a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia.
As Ben Shabbat put it: “After Hamas is defeated and the war ends, the atmosphere will be more conducive to normalization.”