As I arrive in Israel for my 10th visit since Oct. 7, negotiations between the United States and Iran continue. Even if an agreement is reached, its durability will not be determined at the signing ceremony, but in the weeks, months and years that follow, when Iran inevitably tests its limits.
“Backsliding” is the polite diplomatic term. In reality, it is a calibrated Iranian strategy of deception, delay and incremental violations designed to probe American resolve. Tehran’s objective is not simply to reach an agreement, but to erode it over time, turning firm commitments into flexible interpretations and, ultimately, hollow constraints.
At the core of this strategy is a clash of political time horizons: Persian vs. American.
Iran operates on a strategic clock measured in years, decades, even generations. The United States operates on an electoral clock, measured in days, weeks and months. Tehran understands that patience is power. It needs only to outlast an election season to shift the balance and gain leverage.
The regime’s calculus is straightforward: Wait long enough, and American political constraints will do the work for them. Elections intervene every two or four years, public attention shifts, and in the American political cycle, a year can feel like ancient history. By contrast, Iran’s leadership: authoritarian, ideologically and religiously driven, and unburdened by electoral accountability, remains fixed on long-term revolutionary objectives and regime survival. For true believers, the sequence is clear: Rebuild and then return to hegemonic ambitions.
Iranian decision-makers are acutely aware of America’s timelines. In six weeks, the War Powers Act forces a congressional reckoning. In 10 weeks, the administration will be under pressure to demonstrate success ahead of the United States’ 250th anniversary on July 4. Beyond that, the looming midterm elections are already beginning to reshape the political landscape, with Democratic victories in Republican leaning districts. Tehran does not need to win quickly; it only needs to outlast American impatience.
Time is not a backdrop to this conflict. It is the central battleground.
If an agreement is reached, the danger is not immediate collapse but gradual dilution. So long as the Strait of Hormuz remains open and a veneer of stability is maintained, Washington will be tempted to overlook “minor” violations. But this is precisely how agreements unravel, one concession, one overlooked infraction at a time.
Here, Israel offers a critical lesson. After Oct. 7, the doctrine of containment was decisively rejected. Managing threats is no longer sufficient. Violations cannot be tolerated as part of a “new normal.” In America’s case, deterrence must be reestablished immediately, whether through economic pressure or, when necessary, kinetic action. The first violation must carry consequences, not the 50th.
Any agreement with Iran must therefore include not only clear terms, but automatic, enforceable consequences. Ambiguity is not flexibility; it is an invitation to Iranian exploitation.
For Israel, the stakes are even higher. If ballistic-missile constraints are excluded, the threat becomes existential in scale. No Israeli government, regardless of its relationship with Washington, can accept such a reality. Should diplomacy fail to address this, Israel will act.
And it must do so with the clear understanding that future American administrations, or even this one if an agreement is reached, may respond with diplomatic pressure rather than support. After a majority of Democratic senators recently opposed even defensive aid to Israel, it is no longer far-fetched to envision an Israeli strike under a Democratic administration triggering a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning or sanctioning Israel.
This raises a central question: Can the United States sustain a coherent strategy toward Iran in either scenario, whether or not a deal is reached?
The answer is yes, but only with disciplined leadership, not the strength of this president. His last address came too late in the conflict and lacked the clarity and strategic framing needed to persuade those still on the fence.
Trump must address the American people directly and clearly: define objectives, articulate what constitutes success and prepare the public for a process measured in months, not news cycles. This requires restraint and seriousness, far removed from improvisation or rhetorical excess. National strategy cannot be communicated as political theater.
There remains a persuadable segment of the American public, independents and pragmatic voters, who will respond to a rational, clearly articulated case. But that case must be made.
If no agreement is reached, the United States must again treat time as a strategic tool, not a liability, but on our own terms. A sustained embargo or blockade on Iranian oil exports and commercial shipping could impose severe economic pressure, though it would take three to four months to fully take effect and generate real diplomatic leverage. Combined with support for Iran’s internal opposition—potentially including arming elements of that opposition—this approach could shift the regime’s focus inward, toward its own survival.
Such a strategy carries risks, but it also offers the possibility of a more durable outcome: not just a temporary agreement, but a fundamental change in the strategic environment that leads to genuine stability.
Ultimately, this is not only about Iran. It is about American credibility as Washington pivots to its primary adversary, China. What the United States accomplishes in the Strait of Hormuz will directly shape perceptions and outcomes in the Taiwan Strait. If it can demonstrate the patience, discipline and resolve to defend U.S. interests and uphold international order, then key waterways—from Bab el-Mandeb to the Strait of Malacca—are far more likely to remain open to commercial traffic.
Time will decide this conflict. The question is whose clock will prevail: the Persian or the American one.
