On Nov. 11, the U.N. General Assembly re-elected Iran to its Committee for Programme and Coordination with 144 votes. The bureaucratic title might suggest a routine appointment. Yet the committee reviews U.N. programs and recommends priorities. Iran will begin another three-year term in January, retaining a role in the work of an institution founded to uphold international peace and human rights.
The United Nations brings together governments of very different kinds. Dictatorships participate because they are part of the world it represents. Giving their representatives institutional responsibilities involves a further choice. A committee seat provides access, negotiating opportunities and prestige. What criteria justify granting those advantages to Tehran, and what message does that choice send to the victims of the government receiving it?
Iran’s record offers revealing precedents. It served on the Commission on the Status of Women during the 2011-2015 and 2015-2019 terms, returning in March 2022. A regime enforcing compulsory veiling repeatedly gained a seat on a body devoted to gender equality. The United Nations itself has documented arrests and physical assaults against women and girls who defied that requirement.
In December 2022, nine months into its latest term, Iran was removed from the commission because of its repression of women’s rights. Yet the following November, Ambassador Ali Bahreini chaired that year’s Human Rights Council Social Forum. He was not president of the council, but the appointment gave the regime’s representative responsibility and visibility at a human-rights gathering.
Iran’s renewed committee membership presents another contradiction: a regime whose leaders have called for Israel’s elimination will help review the priorities of an organization that counts Israel among its members.
Jewish communities far beyond the Middle East have experienced the consequences of Iran’s international reach. On July 18, 1994, the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires killed 85 people. In April 2024, Argentina’s Federal Court of Criminal Cassation concluded that Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed terrorist organization based in Lebanon, had carried out the attack as part of an Iranian political and strategic plan. The court classified the bombing as a crime against humanity. Iran denies involvement.
Negotiating with Iran may be necessary to resolve conflicts. Giving it a role in reviewing the priorities of the world body requires a different justification.
Brazil has also confronted preparations for attacks against Jewish targets.
In November 2023, its Federal Police launched “Operation Trapiche” to interrupt preparatory acts of terrorism. According to federal prosecutors, the investigation concerned a plan attributed to Hezbollah’s military wing that involved target reconnaissance, as well as logistical and operational arrangements. In September, Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice reinstated one defendant’s conviction for preparatory acts of terrorism.
Hezbollah’s relationship with Tehran extends beyond financing. Reuters reported in March that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had helped rebuild the group’s military command, deploying Iranian officers and participating in war-planning. For Brazilian Jews, Hezbollah’s international reach is a matter of security at home.
Brazil’s diplomatic engagement with Tehran continues alongside those security concerns. On Nov. 12, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of COP31 in Turkey. In a post on X, Lula said he had advocated a peaceful resolution to the conflict, defended Iran’s right to nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes, and expressed interest in expanding bilateral trade, including Brazilian imports of Iranian fertilizer.
Lula’s post mentioned neither “Operation Trapiche” nor the security of Brazil’s Jewish community. Were those concerns on the agenda? Protecting Brazilian citizens from threats linked to a foreign-backed organization should be a diplomatic priority, and the public deserves to know whether it was.
European governments have faced related questions. In 2025, the United States and Britain sanctioned the Foxtrot criminal network, attributing violence against Jewish and Israeli targets in Europe to its work on Iran’s behalf.
These cases do not establish that U.N. appointments cause or facilitate attacks. They do explain why governments should consider Tehran’s conduct beyond its borders when assessing its suitability for institutional responsibilities.
Negotiating with Iran may be necessary to resolve conflicts. Giving its representatives a role in reviewing the priorities of the world body requires a different justification.
The United Nations has documented Iranian abuses and removed the country from its women’s commission. Those findings should carry weight when governments consider its next candidacy.
The ballot was secret, but secrecy need not prevent accountability. Canada and Australia publicly said they voted against Iran. Other governments, including Brazil’s, should disclose their votes. Those that supported Tehran should explain how their decision serves the principles of the U.N. Charter.
Britain illustrates the gap between public criticism and transparency. On Nov. 12, its government told Parliament that it strongly regretted Iran’s election and considered the regime unfit for such a role, but declined to disclose its vote. Expressing opposition to the outcome while withholding one’s own vote leaves an important question unanswered.
What happens at the United Nations does not stay at the United Nations. Its appointments confer influence and legitimacy. Placing regimes that violate fundamental rights in positions of responsibility compromises the organization’s credibility. More is at stake than Iran’s place in a committee: the international agency’s ability to defend the principles that justify its existence.