On Sept. 8, British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband described securing a two-state solution as the British government’s “North Star.”
The phrase suggests moral clarity and an unwavering sense of direction. But a compass is only useful if it takes account of the terrain, and Britain’s increasingly punitive approach toward Israel raises serious questions about whether it does so.
On Nov. 17, Britain announced sanctions against eight Israeli construction and property businesses operating in Judea and Samaria. It further sanctioned Tzav 9, an Israeli protest movement that has obstructed humanitarian aid deliveries to the Gaza Strip.
The British government also warned, yet again, that settlement development, particularly the proposed E1 project east of Jerusalem, threatens the viability of a future Palestinian state.
What received considerably less attention was Palestinian political conduct, the history of failed diplomatic initiatives, continuing terrorist activity and the question of whether Palestinian institutions are preparing their population for genuine coexistence.
The E1 controversy illustrates how Britain’s approach risks overlooking important geographical and security considerations.
Opponents of the E1 project argue that development between Jerusalem and the city of Ma’ale Adumim would undermine Palestinian territorial continuity and threaten the viability of a future state.
Yet a September 2026 analysis by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies acknowledged the complications E1 could create for Palestinian sovereignty and transport arrangements while challenging the assertion that construction would, by itself, make Palestinian statehood geographically impossible.
The geography deserves closer examination.
In an October article for the Israel Institute of New Zealand, Greg Bouwer cited earlier research by the group CAMERA that identified a corridor east of Ma’ale Adumim that was approximately 15 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, only part of which would be affected by E1 construction.
That is comparable in width to Israel’s own narrow coastal plain within the pre-1967 lines, although the geographical and political implications differ considerably.
For Israel, the concern extends beyond territory.
Its principal population centers and critical infrastructure lie beneath the elevated terrain of Judea and Samaria, where Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other terrorist organizations continue to operate. Any proposal to alter security arrangements must therefore explain how those areas would be prevented from becoming platforms for attacks against Israel’s densely populated heartland.
Palestinian territorial continuity deserves serious consideration, but so does the security of an existing state. Neither can responsibly be addressed in isolation.
Geography is only part of the picture.
Britain’s determination to preserve the two-state solution also demands an honest examination of why successive opportunities to achieve it have failed. Without that historical perspective, there is a danger of presenting Israeli settlement activity as the overriding obstacle to Palestinian statehood while overlooking the political decisions and failures that have shaped the conflict for nearly a century.
In 1937, Zionist leaders accepted the British Peel Commission’s partition proposal in principle; Arab leaders rejected it. In 1947, Jewish leaders accepted the United Nations partition plan; Arab leaders rejected it.
Decades later, the 2000 Camp David summit failed, with President Bill Clinton placing considerable responsibility on the late Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat. The subsequent Clinton Parameters and Taba talks also produced no agreement. A Palestinian terrorist campaign that killed 1,000 Israelis followed.
In 2008, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered Arafat’s successor Mahmoud Abbas a far-reaching proposal involving a Palestinian state across most of Judea and Samaria, territorial exchanges and arrangements for Jerusalem.
Abbas did not accept it. Although he later argued that he needed more opportunity to examine the proposed map, another significant diplomatic initiative ended without agreement.
Not every proposal was perfect, nor can every failure be attributed exclusively to Palestinian leaders. But repeated opportunities for compromise have passed without producing a settlement. The absence of Palestinian statehood cannot credibly be explained solely through Israeli construction.
Palestinian territorial continuity deserves serious consideration, but so does the security of an existing state.
There is also the question of what Palestinian statehood is intended to achieve. The Palestine Liberation Organization was established in 1964, when Judea and Samaria were under Jordanian control, and Gaza was administered by Egypt. Its founding program did not envisage a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
Arafat formally recognized Israel in 1993, but critics have long questioned whether that recognition represented a permanent abandonment of the PLO’s earlier “phased” strategy, under which territorial gains could form part of a continuing struggle.
Hamas has never recognized Israel’s legitimacy as a permanent Jewish state. Its 2017 political document contemplated a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines without accepting Israel’s right to exist.
The Palestinian Authority is distinct from Hamas, and its recognition of Israel and security cooperation should be acknowledged. But diplomatic declarations must be judged alongside political conduct. What guarantees would establish that a future Palestinian state is intended to coexist permanently with Israel, rather than become another arena for continued conflict?
One revealing test lies in Palestinian education. In January, the group IMPACT-se published its review of the Palestinian Authority’s 2025-26 curriculum, examining 290 textbooks and 71 teacher guides. It documented continuing examples of antisemitism, glorification of terrorism and martyrdom, rejection of peacemaking and maps omitting Israel.
The Palestinian Authority has promised educational reform, but these findings raise serious questions about implementation. How can two peoples be expected to coexist peacefully if educational materials continue to portray the other’s national existence as illegitimate?
Peace agreements may be signed by leaders, but lasting peace depends upon what future generations are taught.
The Palestinian Authority’s longstanding prisoner-payment arrangements, widely known as “pay for slay,” deserve similar examination. Reforms have been announced to replace prisoner-linked payments with needs-based welfare. Yet in October 2026, the British Government acknowledged that an independent audit had been completed, but its full findings have not been published for verification.
Even genuine reform would not, by itself, address continuing incitement. When terrorism is glorified, and violence against Jews or Israelis is presented as honorable, the consequences extend far beyond classroom rhetoric.
Where is Britain’s comparable urgency to hold Palestinian institutions accountable for the political culture they foster?
The sanctions against Tzav 9 raise a different concern. Its aid blockades have occurred intermittently rather than continuously, and Israeli police have intervened to remove protesters.
Obstructing humanitarian assistance to civilians cannot be condoned. Nevertheless, the movement has raised concerns about Hamas exploiting aid distribution to rebuild its capabilities. Those concerns require evidence and effective safeguards, not automatic dismissal.
Moreover, sanctioning protesters does not explain how Hamas will be prevented from rearming, repressing Palestinians or perpetuating the conflict.
Britain’s approach also carries diplomatic costs. On Oct. 8, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar confirmed that British representatives had been removed from the International Gaza Support Center in Kiryat Gat amid deteriorating relations.
Whatever one’s view of that decision, how does losing a direct role in coordinating Gaza’s future advance Britain’s stated objectives? Diplomatic pressure that diminishes access and influence may undermine the very outcomes it seeks.
Nor should Britain overlook its own historical commitments. Its 1917 Balfour Declaration explicitly supported establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, a commitment subsequently incorporated into the League of Nations Mandate, which recognized the Jewish people’s historical connection to the land.
The Declaration protected the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities but did not propose a separate Palestinian Arab state.
Jewish national self-determination in the ancestral Land of Israel is therefore not a recent political concession to be weighed against Palestinian demands. Palestinian national aspirations must be addressed, but not by diminishing or denying the Jewish people’s equally legitimate right to self-determination.
The prevailing international legal position regards Israeli settlements in occupied territory as unlawful, although Israel disputes important aspects of that interpretation. But legal arguments alone cannot resolve the practical questions of borders, security, recognition and coexistence. Nor can sanctions substitute for confronting Palestinian terrorism, incitement and the institutional failures that obstruct peace.
Ed Miliband’s “North Star” may identify Britain’s preferred destination. But a sustainable settlement requires more than repeatedly invoking the two-state solution while concentrating punitive measures on the State of Israel and applying less scrutiny to those whose conduct threatens that solution’s achievement.
A compass that overlooks half the landscape is unlikely to lead anyone safely to their destination.