For most of the current Israeli government’s tenure, Israelis have been told that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is about to break something.
First, it was the hostage talks, which he was said to be sabotaging to keep his coalition alive. Then it was the Oct. 27 election, which he would supposedly cancel or postpone by way of a war with Iran or another national emergency.
Now that the vote is behind us, the latest warning is of a new Iran strike meant to wreck coalition-building and force Netanyahu’s rivals into a wartime government.
These warnings came from numerous journalists, commentators, politicians, former defense officials and even former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. They all involved a claim about Netanyahu’s hidden motives, a dire forecast and no way for the claim to be tested until the forecast failed.
When it failed, the next warning arrived. Almost no one stopped to count the misses.
“He is sabotaging a hostage deal to save his coalition.”
This was the most serious charge, and it was raised by politicians, hostage families, former aides and, at times, defense officials.
As Netanyahu’s detractors imagined it at the time, a ceasefire with Hamas would collapse his government and, consequently, he would be unable to prevent guilty verdicts in his trial on corruption charges. In other words, only a continuation of the war would keep him out of jail.
The charge rested on an inference about motive. That inference has never been proven by documents or recordings, and Netanyahu has consistently denied it.
The outcome did not match the dire forecast. All 20 living hostages and all 28 deceased hostages were returned. Netanyahu’s coalition survived the final deal. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir left the government in protest and returned within two months. The government not only did not collapse but survived through the last legally possible day.
Brett McGurk, the Biden administration’s chief hostage negotiator, has now published his account of the talks. He rejects the notion that Hamas was ready to release all the hostages early; he says that in January 2025, Hamas accepted terms it had refused the previous summer; and he stated that Israel did not simply drop its demands.
In McGurk’s telling, pressure on Hamas, not unilateral Israeli concessions, produced the breakthrough. Other former Biden administration officials dispute parts of that account, but the closest participant says the central “Netanyahu sabotaged it” narrative is false.
After the warnings failed, the next warning arrived. Almost no one stopped to count the misses.
The prime minister’s actual conduct also looks different from what the warnings predicted. He kept up military pressure until the last hostage was home, accepted a deal he was told would cost him politically and ended up holding roughly two-thirds of Gaza with Hamas disarmament a commitment yet unfulfilled.
One can approve or disapprove of those choices, but they are not those of a man who would do anything to stay in power.
“He will cancel the election.”
A growing share of Israelis bought into the persistent warnings that Netanyahu would postpone the 2026 vote under cover of a national emergency. In the months before the election, reports said the IDF chief had privately raised the risk that renewed fighting with Iran could force a delay.
Over the summer, Ehud Barak said he “wouldn’t rule out” a fabricated crisis days before the vote, with an emergency declared and the election pushed back six months. He said Netanyahu should be removed “with sticks and stones” if he tried to sabotage the election. In early October, Barak accused Netanyahu of laying the groundwork for a war that would postpone the vote.
Nevertheless, the election was held on schedule on Oct. 27.
Barak also warned that Netanyahu might respond to an unsatisfactory result by claiming fraud. This was borne out in rhetoric but not in action: After the vote, Netanyahu’s Likud Party alleged that Arab-sector polling stations had “stolen” the election, and Netanyahu called the reports an earthquake for Israeli democracy.
The Central Elections Committee’s review found no irregularities that could have affected the outcome, and the results were certified. The Shin Bet’s separate inquiry concerns suspected foreign funding of Arab turnout, not direct ballot-box fraud.
Netanyahu’s rhetoric did not become organized mobilization or Knesset disruption. The only street actions were small demonstrations by supporters—about 200 people at one Tel Aviv rally—and I found no report that Netanyahu has rejected the real election results.
Since the election, however, similar accusations have returned:
- Netanyahu will attack Iran to pressure rivals into a wartime unity government, a scenario laid out by Democrats Party leader Yair Golan.
- Netanyahu is lobbying U.S. President Donald Trump to strike Iran now that the U.S. midterm elections are over, which AP attributed to various officials.
- Netanyahu could escalate “within days” to improve his chances of keeping power, as E.U.-focused commentary put it.
- Any new conflict would serve to delay or derail the formation of a government without Netanyahu.
As of this writing, none of these have proved true.
So, who bears the burden of proof?
Whether an earlier deal could have saved more hostages is a legitimate question that will never be proven or disproven. Whether a strike on Iran is wise is a policy question that should be debated on its merits, not by guessing at secret motives.
But after a record like this one, the burden rests on the people who make the accusations. If you tell the public that the prime minister is plotting to sabotage negotiations and democracy, yet the hostages come home, the coalition holds, and the election takes place as scheduled, you owe the public more than the next warning.