In recent days it has emerged that the Israel Defense Forces has to date uncovered and blocked off 150 smuggling tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor sector of Rafah in the Gaza Strip, and the question of who will control this critical area has become a central sticking point during hostage negotiations with Hamas in Cairo.
The scope of the uncovered tunnel network marks a significant counter-terrorism success, yet simultaneously illustrates why Israel should be cautious about withdrawing from this strategic corridor, observers in Israel have told JNS.
According to Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of the Research and Assessment Division of Israel’s Military Intelligence and a senior research fellow at Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, if Israel were to withdraw, there would be a resurgence of arms smuggling from Egypt into Gaza.
“The reality of so many tunnels under the corridor makes it clear that what will happen is a renewal of the smuggling of arms from Egypt to Gaza,” stated Kuperwasser, who is also a senior research fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Foreign Affairs. “Why does Hamas so insist on this corridor, if nothing is supposed to happen?”
Kuperwasser also pointed out that relying on Egypt to prevent these smuggling activities has proven to be an unrealistic hope.
“It’s obvious that Israel can’t rely on the Egyptians. They promised and supposedly acted to prevent these smuggling activities, but in practice, you see the vast amounts of weapons Hamas has. Why should this change?”
Kuperwasser argued that the Egyptian interest remains the same—to avoid being perceived as fighting “Palestinian resistance.”
“They can’t afford to genuinely combat this smuggling,” he said. He further noted that as long as Palestinian smuggling activities continue, Israel remains dependent on Egypt, and this dependency can be exploited by Cairo.
“As long as the Palestinians attack Israel, Israel needs the Egyptians more,” he observed. “There is also apparently the aspect of sorts of people who made money from this activity,” Kuperwasser added. “A lot of money is involved.”
Kuperwasser also warned against the notion that foreign or Palestinian forces could effectively prevent future smuggling operations.
“We have already tried all these tricks; they never worked,” he stated, emphasizing that the flow of weapons into Gaza would resume if Israel withdraws from the Philadelphi Corridor. “There will be no clause in a future agreement in which Hamas commits itself not to smuggle weapons from Egypt. We, on the other hand, will be prevented from entering as an explicit clause in the agreement,” he added.
Kuperwasser stressed that an Israeli return to the corridor after a withdrawal would be nearly impossible due to political pressures.
“There will always be political conditions that will prevent us from returning. Israel may want to return, but won’t be able to. There will be American pressure. The Egyptians will say absolutely not. The Iranians will threaten to attack if we do,” he said.
As a result, Kuperwasser said, the Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor is essential to ensure that Hamas and other terror organizations in Gaza are not able to rebuild their massive terror infrastructure in Gaza.
He emphasized the need for Israel to establish an underground counter-tunnel barrier similar to the one built along the Israel-Gaza border and to maintain a military presence in the area to ensure its effectiveness.
Professor Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies and the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, highlighted that control over the corridor is synonymous with control over the Rafah Border Crossing between Gaza and Egypt.
“The Rafah Crossing has served as the main platform for smuggling weapons into Gaza, all with Egypt turning a blind eye,” he stated.
Abandoning the corridor and crossing before establishing monitoring and control mechanisms transparent to Israel means losing control over the corridor and crossing in the future,” he warned.
This control could be established, Michael argued, by creating a military presence at Rafah Crossing, or through building a meticulous sensor and surveillance system that is accessible to Israel and enables it operational freedom of movement.
Michael, too, dismissed as baseless the notion, often repeated by Israeli defense officials, that Israel could easily return to the corridor if needed. Drawing on past experiences after Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005, he said, “We couldn’t do it after the disengagement from Gaza in 2005, and we won’t be able to do it—or at least, it will be very difficult—after withdrawing from there,” he noted.
“Israel would face extensive international and American pressure, as well as Egyptian pressure, including threats to cancel the peace agreement.”
Michael emphasized the need for Israel to reach an understanding with the United States and Egypt regarding direct Israeli control over the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah Crossing until a barrier similar to the one along the Gaza border is completed, and until the Rafah Crossing is operated by a Palestinian element that is “not Hamas” and is under “international supervision that is fully transparent to Israel.”