The recent framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon includes several elements that should not be dismissed. Most importantly, Israel is not required to withdraw immediately from southern Lebanon before clear signs emerge that Hezbollah’s military power is being dismantled.
This shows that an important lesson from the past has been at least partially learned: An Israeli withdrawal without a real change in the balance of power inside Lebanon does not bring quiet. It only gives Hezbollah time, space and legitimacy to reorganize, rebuild and prepare for the next round.
But this is where the problem begins. An agreement that does not require a comprehensive process for dismantling Hezbollah will not dismantle Hezbollah. At best, it may postpone the next war and create the appearance of diplomatic progress. It will not change the basic reality: an armed, wealthy, Iranian-backed terrorist organization continues to hold Lebanon hostage.
The recurring Israeli, Lebanese and international mistake is to treat Hezbollah as a military problem alone. Hezbollah possesses rockets, precision missiles, elite forces and terrorist infrastructure. But it is also a political movement, a social network, an economic system, a religious mechanism and, in practice, a state within a state. Anyone who seeks to dismantle Hezbollah merely by pushing it away from the Israeli border is not dismantling it. He is only moving it temporarily.
If the international community and the Lebanese government truly want to disarm Hezbollah, they must begin by treating it as what it is: a terrorist organization that controls a state from within.
The first step must be a clear Lebanese legal and political framework, backed by international designation, sanctions and pressure, that rejects all components of Hezbollah; not only its military wing, but also its political, financial and social arms. The artificial distinction between “military Hezbollah” and “political Hezbollah” is an illusion that has only allowed the organization to grow stronger.
Lebanese politicians who operate on behalf of Hezbollah or openly serve its goals should not remain part of the institutions of government. A terrorist organization cannot be allowed to hold missiles and weapons while controlling ministers, members of parliament, welfare institutions and semi-independent financial organizations.
We have already seen what happens when agreements are not accompanied by real enforcement.
At the same time, Hezbollah’s economic infrastructure must be targeted. Asset seizures, personal sanctions against senior figures, disruption of funding channels and the closure of financial institutions identified with the organization are basic conditions for weakening it.
Institutions such as Jihad al-Binaa and Al-Qard al-Hassan are not merely “social assistance” organizations. They are part of Hezbollah’s mechanism of control over Lebanon’s Shi’ite population. Through these institutions, Hezbollah distributes resources, creates dependence, buys loyalty and establishes itself as a substitute for the Lebanese state. The same is true of the organization’s religious networks, which deliver radical messages and deepen Hezbollah’s ideological grip.
Yet pressure alone is not enough. Hezbollah cannot be weakened without offering Lebanese Shi’ites a real alternative. If the Lebanese government, with the support of moderate Arab states and the international community, does not provide services, infrastructure, education, health care, employment and personal security to the Shi’ite community, Hezbollah will continue to “buy” this community. It will go on presenting itself as a force that protects, provides and cares, even as it leads Lebanon from one disaster to another.
A serious process against Hezbollah must therefore include four pillars: sustained military pressure to prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing itself in Southern Lebanon; a legal and political campaign to dismantle the organization’s legitimacy; economic pressure aimed at suffocating its institutions, assets and funding networks; and a broad civilian program designed to reconnect Lebanon’s Shi’ite population to the Lebanese state rather than leaving it dependent on Hezbollah and Iran.
In the current reality, and in the absence of either sufficient will or sufficient capability on the part of the Lebanese army to confront Hezbollah directly, the military component will have to remain primarily Israel’s responsibility.
This is a difficult, long and complex process, but there is no alternative. Those looking for a quick solution, a festive signing ceremony or a diplomatic formula that will persuade Hezbollah to voluntarily give up its power are refusing to learn from the past. We have already seen what happens when withdrawals, understandings and international resolutions are not accompanied by real enforcement. Hezbollah uses every pause to rearm, dig in and prepare for the next war.
The residents of northern Israel and the citizens of Lebanon do not need more promises. They need a new security reality in which Hezbollah is not merely moved away from the border but gradually loses its ability to control Lebanon and threaten the people of both countries.
If the current agreement becomes just another document that speaks about Lebanese sovereignty while failing to dismantle the organization that has trampled that sovereignty for decades, it will not be the beginning of a solution. It will be only another chapter in the long story of our refusal to learn from the mistakes of the past.
