The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants of arrest in November 2024 against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.
On Oct. 9, the United States answered by placing the court itself under its sanctions regime. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio promised that either the court would end its threats or America would end the court.
Much of the commentary has treated this as a political quarrel. It is better understood as a legal one, and the first question is whether the court had the authority to act at all.
The Rome Statute confers jurisdiction, under Article 12, over crimes committed on the territory of a state party or by the nationals of one.
Israel is neither. It never surrendered its citizens to a treaty it declined to join, and the oldest rule in the law of treaties, pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, codified in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, holds that a treaty neither binds nor benefits a non-party.
The ICC’s jurisdiction therefore had to rest entirely on the other limb of Article 12—the territory of the so-called “State of Palestine.”
That was the question on which everything turned, and the court settled it by not deciding it.
“Palestine” was recognized by the U.N. General Assembly as a non-member observer state in 2012 and on that footing acceded to the statute in January 2015. But accession is an administrative act and cannot manufacture statehood.
Whether “Palestine” satisfies the settled Montevideo criteria of population, territory, effective government and the capacity to conduct foreign relations remains among the most contested questions in the discipline.
In February 2021, a pre-trial chamber, by two votes to one, treated “Palestine” as a state for the sole purpose of the statute while expressly declining to rule on statehood in general international law.
A long dissent exposed a plain circularity: Accession made “Palestine” a party, and party status then supplied the very statehood that Article 12 presupposes. A jurisdiction built on a statehood the court would not affirm is not a secure foundation. It is a convenient one.
There is a deeper difficulty, the one that the ICC has spent years avoiding.
The mechanism by which a territorial state brings the court’s jurisdiction into being is, in substance, a delegation of that state’s own criminal jurisdiction. Yet under the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was never granted criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals. One cannot transfer what one has never held. Nemo dat quod non habet is not a technicality; it’s the line between a court and a committee.
The ICC prosecution’s reply—that acceptance under the statute is not delegation at all and cannot be accepted in part—proves too much, for it would let the court conjure jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties that no state involved possesses.
There is also the issue of admissibility.
No citizen should be judged by a court to whose jurisdiction his state never consented.
The ICC was built to be a court of last resort. Under Article 17, a case is inadmissible when a state with jurisdiction is genuinely investigating or prosecuting, unless that state is unwilling or unable to act.
Israel has one of the most active and independent judiciaries in the democratic world. Its Supreme Court regularly rules against its own government and army. A tribunal built to fill the void left by collapsed or captured legal systems was never meant to displace a working one.
Then there is immunity.
A sitting head of government of a non-party state enjoys personal immunity under customary international law, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed in the Arrest Warrant case, Congo against Belgium, in 2002.
The ICC set this aside in 2019, in the Al-Bashir litigation, ruling that no such immunity applies before it even for the leaders of states that never joined, a holding doubted by serious scholars ever since.
So, prosecution of a serving prime minister of a non-member state stands on the most uncertain ground the court has.
None of this defends any act, and in the same breath the court issued a warrant against a Hamas commander.
But the most revealing fact is procedural. In April 2025, the court’s own appeals chamber found that the pre-trial chamber had been wrong to wave away Israel’s challenge to jurisdiction and sent it back to be examined properly.
The warrants stayed in force throughout, and the foundational question—whether the court may exercise jurisdiction at all—has still not been resolved. A court confident of its authority does not act first and reason afterwards.
So much for legality.
Legitimacy is a separate matter. Here, the argument British journalist Douglas Murray has presented deserves a hearing: Authority flows not from a founding treaty alone but from consistency, impartiality and restraint.
The machinery around this case tells its own story. The U.N. Human Rights Council keeps a single permanent agenda item devoted to one country, and that country is Israel. The ICJ has refused to dismiss a charge of genocide pressed with a seriousness it has rarely shown elsewhere. Each body speaks the vocabulary of law, yet together they resemble less a system of justice than a settled verdict in search of a forum.
The ICC has not even kept order in its own house, for the very prosecutor who sought the warrants in question, Karim Khan, was removed by the member states in 2026 amid misconduct allegations he denies.
The American sanctions are a blunt instrument, first imposed by executive order in February 2025 and widened in October. Reasonable people may doubt whether a financial blockade of a court is wise or proportionate. But the sanctions are a symptom, not the disease.
Washington’s objection has been consistent across administrations of both parties for a quarter-century and rests on a principle with nothing partisan about it: No citizen should be judged by a court to whose jurisdiction his state never consented.
That is not contempt for international law. It is a demand that international law obey its own rules.
This is where the friends of international justice, not its enemies, should be the most troubled. A criminal law applied to some and not others is not a higher law but a weapon, and a weapon in the hands of the powerful or the well-organized is precisely what the rule of law exists to restrain. Small nations like Israel have the greatest stake in a genuine international order, because law is the only shield they hold against force.
A court that forgets the law cannot be trusted to defend it. The remedy is not to abandon the idea of international justice. It is to insist that it earn the name.