The question is not whether Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations, but when. The more important questions are what political formula will make normalization possible, what each country stands to gain and what they can build together to make the relationship durable.
Security may open the door, and economic transformation may deepen the relationship, but another opportunity deserves far more attention: By combining complementary strengths, Israel and Saudi Arabia can blaze a path toward discovering and developing new medicines while helping to build biotechnology companies capable of competing globally.
The Palestinian issue remains the most visible political constraint on normalization, as Saudi Arabia maintains that normalization requires an irreversible path toward Palestinian statehood. Israel’s current government rejects Palestinian statehood, and I do not believe this would change under a different government, given that Oct. 7 fundamentally changed Israel’s understanding of its security interests.
That does not make normalization impossible. The practical question is what political horizon Riyadh needs to move forward without appearing to abandon the Palestinian cause. Earlier negotiations showed there may be space between immediate Palestinian statehood and no political horizon at all.
However, the United States has introduced a complication that could ultimately help. U.S. President Donald Trump has tied U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia to normalization with Israel. At first glance, that may appear to create another obstacle for Riyadh, but in my view, it may make Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s task easier by giving him a national-interest framework through which normalization can be presented to the Saudi public and the Arab and Muslim world more broadly.
Rather than presenting normalization as a favor to Israel or as abandoning the Palestinians, the Crown Prince could frame it as a “Saudi Arabia first” agreement that advances Saudi interests through civilian nuclear cooperation, a deeper strategic relationship with Washington, greater regional security and new economic and technological opportunities.
Security is one reason for Saudi Arabia to seek normalization. Iran remains the Saudis’ most serious regional security challenge and, although diplomacy with Tehran can be useful, it does not eliminate Riyadh’s interest in deterrence, intelligence and technological capability.
However, there are incentives well beyond security. The Saudis’ Vision 2030 plan seeks a more diversified, technologically advanced and knowledge-based Saudi economy, in which biotechnology will play a major part. The kingdom’s National Biotechnology Strategy aims to build capabilities across the biotechnology value chain and establish Saudi Arabia as a global biotechnology hub.
In this regard, the Saudis do not need another strategy document. They need capability, technology, experienced human capital, development programs and a functioning industry.
Israel has a valuable contribution to make, given its remarkable biomedical discoveries and promising drug candidates, as well as its robust biotechnology ecosystem. But Israel also has a problem: Its strength in generating innovation has not consistently translated into the ability to build globally competitive pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies capable of successfully carrying discoveries through late-stage clinical development and commercialization. Too often, promising Israeli assets are out-licensed or acquired by foreign companies before they can mature into global businesses.
The Crown Prince could frame normalization as a “Saudi Arabia first” agreement.
Turning a discovery into a medicine requires far more than laboratory science. It requires translational and clinical-development expertise; regulatory capabilities; substantial capital; clinical-trial infrastructure; access to large and diverse patient populations; and the ability to advance increasingly expensive programs through their final stages. Thus, Saudi Arabia does not need only Israeli innovation while Israel provides expertise. Israel needs Saudi Arabia as well.
Saudi Arabia has a large population, expanding healthcare and clinical-research infrastructure, substantial investment capacity and a national commitment to biotechnology. Through regional cooperation, it could connect development programs to broader patient populations and clinical-research capabilities across the GCC. Israel could contribute discovery and early development while Saudi Arabia contributes the scale and resources to build capabilities further along the development chain.
Therefore, a future normalization agreement should include the establishment of a joint drug-discovery and development framework. Its purpose should not be to create another research institute, hold another scientific conference or simply establish a Saudi investment vehicle for Israeli biotechnology. It should establish a pathway for promising treatments to transition to medicines and, where applicable, facilitate the emergence and growth of biotechnology companies with global influence.
Israeli discoveries and drug candidates could be identified and evaluated for development potential. The strongest programs could receive targeted, milestone-based support and then be connected to Saudi and regional clinical-trial infrastructure, patient populations and operational capabilities. The objective should be continuity across the drug-development chain, from discovery through translational and preclinical development into clinical trials, late-stage development and commercialization.
International pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies should be part of that ecosystem, contributing expertise and becoming development or commercialization partners when programs mature.
Saudi Arabia would concretely benefit from all this because, instead of trying to build a theoretical biotechnology industry or importing isolated expertise, it could build capability by participating in real drug-development programs. Scientists, physicians, clinical investigators, regulators, investors and operating teams would gain experience by advancing medicines while the kingdom develops the capabilities required for a functioning life sciences industry.
Over time, such a framework could become a regional drug-development ecosystem, initially serving the Gulf and the Middle East and eventually competing globally. Israel would gain access to development scale, clinical-research infrastructure, patient populations and capital that are difficult to assemble domestically, while Saudi Arabia would accelerate the development of a life-sciences capability that might otherwise take decades to build. Both countries could participate in creating medicines and companies with global economic value, while the region gains a meaningful role in global drug development.
Scientific cooperation should therefore not be treated as an afterthought to normalization, because relationships between countries become durable when their interests become difficult to separate.
Israel and Saudi Arabia will not agree on everything, because strategic partners rarely do; however, normalization is more likely to survive future disagreements if it rests on concrete mutual benefit rather than symbolism alone. Security may be the immediate reason for normalization, but Vision 2030 offers Saudi Arabia a compelling economic and technological rationale. Meanwhile, Israel has its own strategic and economic reasons for transforming more of its scientific innovation into globally developed medicines and companies.
A joint pathway to discovering and developing those medicines while helping create globally competitive biotechnology companies could turn normalization from a diplomatic agreement into something both countries have a lasting interest in preserving.
