The claim that an uprising in Iran can be “ignited” through external action sounds dramatic, but it is equally misleading. An uprising is not an event that can be manufactured from the outside, certainly not at the push of a button.
Anyone familiar with how intelligence organizations operate knows that uprisings are not created but identified, amplified and, at times, guided.
If reports are accurate that David Barnea, the director of the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, presented the overthrow of the regime as an achievable objective in the near or medium term, it is worth examining the foundations of that assessment.
In my view, if Barnea indeed assessed the goal as attainable, he was referring to the medium term and beyond. Regimes do not fall because someone outside decides to topple them; they collapse when an internal crack develops, and only then can an external actor, if acting correctly, widen it.
The real question, therefore, is not how to “ignite” an uprising, but how to identify the conditions for its maturation—and when those conditions are still absent.
To understand this, one must start with the basics. An uprising is not the result of an anonymous crowd suddenly taking to the streets, but of cumulative processes within key groups: students, workers, labor unions, mid-level officials within state institutions and, at times, opinion leaders in cultural or religious arenas.
Igniting an uprising, step by step
The first stage is diagnosis—identifying points of frustration, feelings of humiliation and the gap between the official narrative and reality. This is a quiet, almost invisible stage, but a critical one. Without a precise understanding of the sources of pain, there is nothing to build on.
The second stage is penetration of human networks, not in the romantic sense of spy films, but through building relationships, channels of influence and familiarity with internal dynamics. This does not necessarily mean recruiting an “agent,” but rather developing the ability to influence existing groups from within.
The third stage is cognitive, and this is where the real work begins—not convincing people to take to the streets, but helping them understand they are not alone. An uprising occurs when one person realizes 10 others think the same way, and when those 10 realize there are already 100.
At the same time, an alternative narrative is required. Not one imported from outside that sounds foreign, but one rooted in local identity—not “rebellion” but “salvation,” not “collapse” but “repair.” Without such a narrative, even deep frustration does not translate into action.
Yet even when all these conditions are met, there is no certainty. Above all hovers one factor—fear. Regimes such as Iran’s are not merely governing mechanisms but sophisticated systems of surveillance, repression and punishment. Anyone who takes to the streets risks not only themselves but their family as well. In such a reality, even profound anger may remain suppressed.
Pressure on the West
This begs the question: Why is that not happening now? The answer may lie in the gap between destabilizing the system and building an alternative one.
Recent military actions, as impressive as they may be, have undermined the regime’s sense of immunity, but destabilization alone is not enough. When there is no clear answer to the question of what comes next, fear outweighs frustration.
Moreover, it appears that within key groups, sufficient momentum has yet to form. An uprising is not born on the street alone, but at the intersection between the street and the elite. As long as mid-level ranks, officers, bureaucrats and managers do not signal hesitation or a crack, the public remains isolated.
This is an infrastructure that requires years to build, not a momentary move. It is also possible that external pressure itself is working in the opposite direction—instead of dismantling the regime, it strengthens internal cohesion around a shared threat. In the Iranian context, this is a familiar and, at times, effective mechanism.
In any case, the conclusion is clear—uprisings are not ignited by slogans, and regimes are not toppled by external forces alone.
Change occurs when three conditions converge—an internal crack, an alternative narrative and a collective recognition that the risk of taking to the streets is lower than the risk of staying home. Without these, even impressive military moves remain tactical achievements. When they do exist, uprisings need no ignition—they erupt on their own.
Originally published by Israel Hayom.
