In a previous article I proposed that we view the Iron Swords War as a campaign by which to shift Israeli strategy from defense to offense—in other words, moving from an enforcement approach manifested via a series of “deterrence operations” to a decisive approach with the imperative of quickly removing the military threat in the enemy’s territory.
The word “decisiveness” is used here in the traditional sense in our defense strategy, meaning an approach limited to the opponent’s military force. My recommendation was to realize the achievements of the Iron Swords War through a hostage deal and the dictation of terms for the restoration of the Gaza Strip. The strategic lull that would then be created must be used to rebuild the Israel Defense Forces for a decisive campaign.
This article expands on the strategic options facing Israel and the strategy that must be developed.
Israel’s options for war in the north
After the Oct. 7 attack, it became clear that Israel can no longer tolerate the existence of a terrorist army on its border. In the Gaza Strip, the immediate threat has been removed, although the security of the southern settlements in the coming years will depend on constant counterterrorism activity. The conclusion is that war in the north is not a question of if, but of how and when.
There are three basic approaches to fighting a war against Hezbollah. In all of them, the State of Israel would harm the Hezbollah organization as much as it could through intel-based aerial bombing. The approaches differ in their central ideas.
Approach 1: Punishing the host country
This approach assumes that tremendous damage caused to Lebanon by Israel would result in heavy pressure to stop the war from both Hezbollah’s opponents and supporters inside Lebanon, as well as from outside. Without removing the bulk of the enemy’s military power, such a war would likely end, as did the Second Lebanon War, with an agreement to demilitarize southern Lebanon, accompanied by international guarantees. A painful competition between the two sides, both of which possess enormous quantities of accurate long-range firepower, would inevitably mean a long war. It would last many weeks at the very least, cause tremendous damage to Israel’s home front and end in negotiations that would begin at a point when the State of Israel was exhausted both militarily and internationally. It should be emphasized that after nine months of war, the citizens of Israel cannot expect air defenses as effective as that to which they have become accustomed until now. We are ready for this form of war today.
Approach 2: Removal of Hezbollah forces a few kilometers from the border via a ground offensive
In a war of this kind, our ground forces would be exposed to overwhelming firepower in the form of anti-tank missiles and aerial threats while engaging in hard fighting on land. Today, our forces on the northern border are able to avoid exposure to the enemy, which is directing its firepower towards empty houses instead. A heavy price will be paid when that fire capacity is directed at our advancing forces.
Once our forces complete the occupation of the designated strip, Israel would face a new situation. The troops would now be exposed targets for Hezbollah firepower, most of which would be kept north of our new line of forces. In addition to the exposure of our soldiers, this all-out war would result, as did the first scenario, in the entire State of Israel becoming a target for massive and precise strikes. This approach would exact an even heavier price than the previous one and would end in a similar agreement. We are also ready for such a war today.
Approach 3: A war aimed at removing Hezbollah’s military threat over Israel and demilitarizing Lebanon
If the State of Israel achieves this war aim, the result would be significant freedom of action in Lebanon. The situation would resemble the current state of affairs in Syria, and Israel would be able to forcefully prevent the restoration of Hezbollah in the years to come.
The IDF laid out preparations for such a war in the multi-year “Momentum” (2020-2024) program. The idea in that plan depended on a significant modernization of the ground forces to enable them to suppress and paralyze sources of fire while advancing in enemy territory, in the process protecting both themselves and the home front while assisting and backing up the air defense system. The plan also included a dramatic increase in unmanned aerial vehicles and drones in the ground tactical ranks to uncover the enemy’s locations. We are seeing the fruits of this plan in combat today, but only on a limited scale. The key elements of the plan remain on paper or are in only the initial stages of implementation. Even the elements that were promoted more quickly were greatly eroded over the nine months of the war, and the acute need for tactical air defense systems has recently become apparent. The IDF is not yet ready for such a war.
The next question is timing. Many are calling for war now. The pressure on the remaining residents of the north, and of course on the displaced, is unbearable. This is accompanied by political pressure. The demand for “total victory” in both the south and the north has become a threshold demand for a demonstration of national patriotism. But as Hans Morgenthau said, “The moral virtue of the realist is prudence.”
The first two approaches, which are the only ones available to Israeli decisionmakers at the moment, would exact huge prices from the State of Israel and would both end in an agreement no different from one that would be reached without such a severe escalation. In any case, no agreement with Hezbollah would prevent its renewed strengthening and a return to the Oct. 6 situation in the blink of an eye. Recall that on the eve of the current war, the northern border was in a process of constant and prolonged escalation by Hezbollah, possibly in preparation for its own initiation of a war.
No progress regarding the return of the displaced Israelis will be achieved as a result of a war that would end in a (very) bloody draw and an agreement that Israel would not be able to trust. In such a scenario, every Israeli citizen—including, of course, the residents of the north— would understand that another war in the north was only a matter of time, and not much time. The entire Iranian axis would be greatly encouraged by an attack that ends yet again with Israel not having achieved a decisive result.
Assessing the situation in the current war
Unless the unexpected happens, our forces will find Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar and his gang and kill or capture them despite the kidnapped human shields surrounding them, and this blow will collapse the continued resistance of Hamas. It appears that the strategic potential of the Gaza offensive is waning.
As stated, the Iron Swords War should be seen as an operation to create the conditions for a hostage deal, obtain operational freedom of action in Gaza and dictate the terms of the Strip’s rehabilitation. Its strategic goal should be to enable a transition from a strategy of containment and reconciliation to a strategy of dismantling the Iranian stranglehold on our borders.
Those who think that Iron Swords should continue in its current form indefinitely need only take note of the hardened positions of Hamas, the exhaustion of our tactical and reserve ranks, the depletion of our combat resources and our damaged international position (which affects our military capability). All these indicate that we are past the culmination point of the attack.
If Israel reaches a hostage deal, it would be a justified and honorable end to this phase of the fighting, which, as said above, would also achieve the dissolution of the offensive threat of Hamas, military freedom of action for Israel in the Gaza Strip and Israeli stipulation of conditions for its rehabilitation. Hezbollah has already made clear that the cessation of hostilities in Gaza will lead to its own cessation in the north. The State of Israel can, and should, realize the current war’s achievements and allow itself to focus all its forces on preparing for a decisive war in the north. The defeat of the Hezbollah army in Lebanon will collapse the center of gravity of the Iranian stranglehold.
The battle before the war
Wars tend to be decided to an enormous extent not only by the spirit, morale and quality of the leadership, but also—perhaps above all—by the quality of preparations. This is “the battle before the war.”
Even when preparing for a war focused on military decisiveness, there are fundamental differences in approach. We will abandon the approach of war from the air, which we ruled out in the previous analysis. In the field of the decisive war there are two approaches.
Approach 1: Industrial method and quantitative advantage. In this approach, the battlefield is characterized by complex topography; built-up, mountainous and complicated areas; and precise and advanced fire threats. Attacking forces erode at a high rate, and clearing the area takes a long time. This kind of war is expected to be long and exhausting, as evidenced by the operations in Ukraine and Gaza. The conclusion is that the IDF must greatly increase the order of its forces and prepare for a very long war. A long war means, among other things, huge war stocks and imminent preparation for independence in the field of war industry and supply chains. Even the United States and Europe have difficulty setting these goals, let alone realizing them.
Approach 2: Qualitative advantage that enables decisive operations as opposed to attrition warfare. All the diagnoses of the first approach are correct, but a long war of attrition would be very difficult for Israel to withstand and would only serve our enemies. To avoid this, Israel must adopt innovative tactics that prevent the enemy from freely launching fire toward our rear and on our forces and that greatly improve our ability to locate and destroy the enemy. This is the approach described earlier as the main idea of the IDF’s multi-year “Momentum” program, and it has only partially been realized. It is also described in other places.
After the Yom Kippur War, in a post-traumatic response, the IDF doubled the order of its forces and in some areas tripled it. The defense budget rose to about 30% of GDP. It soon became clear that the Israeli economy was facing collapse. In the First Lebanon War, the mighty IDF entered the mountainous roads of Lebanon and the result was huge traffic jams. At the tactical level, the huge IDF of 1982 turned out to be an amateur army with mediocre performance, suffering from an acute manpower crisis.
Since the 1980s, the IDF has been constantly reducing the size of its combat forces on land and in the air. Some believe, mistakenly, that this process is the result of a military strategy, as stated by Chief of Staff (1991-1995) Ehud Barak, that aimed for a “small and smart army.” The truth is that this is a deterministic process that has affected all Western armies—indeed, it has affected even the Russian army, which has been planning a war for years.
Why? Because it is simply impossible to maintain an army on a 20th century-style industrial scale while maintaining a minimum quality standard for modern warfare. Aircraft, tanks and armaments, as well as their maintenance, have become too expensive. Some hold the view that we must prepare for a long war by constantly lowering the bar—that is, by building a 20th century-style army with much less intelligence and PGM support and a lower level of protection for the troops. They are wrong, and this war approach is against the Israeli interest.
The State of Israel has always relied on a qualitative advantage to refine its crushing ability and avoid competition for endurance. Remember that we are not competing with Hezbollah for endurance but with Iran’s military and economic potential. We are also fighting the structured and rising hostility of the international community toward us. Long wars will inevitably turn against Israel.
A sustainable Israeli decisive ability will rest on the qualitative advantage of our forces on the battlefield, and on only a cautious and moderate military increase in the order of the forces.
A Churchillian move
Oct. 7 changed everything. It also changed nothing. The State of Israel is far from prepared for the decisive stage in its 30-year war with Iran and its proxies. Instead, it continues to use up resources in a fruitless skirmish in the south and the north and is not engaging in the preparations required for the next stage. The Iron Swords War is nothing more than a transitional phase. The main confrontation is still ahead of us.
It was announced in March that a defense budget of 117 billion shekels ($32 billion) had been approved for 2024. This constitutes an increase of about 80% over the previous year. This huge amount does not include the approximately $14 billion in special U.S. aid recently approved by Congress. Part of the defense budget will be dedicated to reserve expenses and for the days of fighting. Another part will be allocated to the replenishing of stocks, but this will apparently be only partial compensation.
The State of Israel is fighting for its life. We can’t keep managing this war as if it were another war against an “asymmetric adversary.” The Shi’ite axis senses our weakness.
Between the campaign in France in May 1940 and the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the economy of Great Britain and the Dominions in its entirety, both present and future, was enslaved to wartime buildup. A huge fleet, hundreds of new warships, tens of thousands of tanks and planes, and millions of fully equipped soldiers were committed to securing the future of Britain and the free world. The whole U.S. economy was also quickly mobilized for the colossal war effort.
The State of Israel needs to make a similarly sweeping Churchillian move to ensure that its ability to crush its enemies is restored after decades of wrong strategy.
The 117 billion shekel figure is about 6% of Israeli GDP for 2022, which was about $525 billion. This is a lot in terms of an international comparison, but it is not enough for a nation fighting for its life.
Defense economy
Even a Churchillian move that ensures victory in the next war must be smart, effective, efficient and non-wasteful.
Let’s review the various approaches to war:
The “big army” approach to a long war requires huge investments in combat platforms (tanks, armored vehicles, helicopter gunships, airplanes, etc.). To put it bluntly, just equipping existing IDF divisions— not including new divisions—with advanced combat vehicles would require tens of billions and several decades. The picture just barely improves if it is assumed that only some forces would have advanced mobility while others would get by with less. In any case, this task cannot be completed within a few years.
It would be even more difficult to maintain such a force over time. Maintaining advanced tanks and armored vehicles, let alone helicopters and planes, is a huge expense, much larger than maintenance of the mechanical vehicles of the twentieth century. Thus, a significant increase in the IDF would impose a huge defense expenditure on the State of Israel, not only in the years of immediate strengthening but throughout the following decades as well. A more likely scenario is that within about a decade, under such heavy budgetary constraints, Israel starts reducing the army again, as it did in the 1980s.
The “big army” approach would mean an immediate increase in Israel’s defense budget for the coming years to around 20% of GDP. Even with that increase, the rate of industrial production would not be sufficient to equip the new large army with the quality and scope of ammunition (even if inaccurate) required for a long war. But the real waste would begin with the inevitable force reduction vector, an expense that would go down the drain.
The “qualitative advantage” approach is focused on ground forces modernization. Some mistakenly see land maneuvering and “technology” as contradictory. On the contrary. Modernized ground forces have a better chance of locating the enemy first, finding and destroying his tunnels, and denying him the freedom to launch anti-tank missiles and aircraft, which are the dominant factors in successful operations today. The size of the force is important, but without addressing survivability and effectiveness, it will not make a difference.
Tactical effectiveness—i.e., the practical lethality of the force—should also shorten a war, which would mean considerable savings in war supplies and industrial infrastructure. According to this approach, combat stocks that have been used up so far must be replenished. Larger stocks will of course be required, but not for many months. The main effort should be strengthening the quality components described above.
If we follow rough rules of thumb, we can estimate that several additional billions will be allocated for stockpiles. This is not a large amount thanks to those $14 billion in special American aid, a large portion of which is intended for interceptors, defense systems and ammunition. A few billion should be directed toward the acquisition of a capacity for widespread and effective suppression of enemy launches at the home front and at our forces. These systems should be integrated into the ground forces for their defense and for improved defense of the home front. An additional few billion should go towards protecting the fighting forces and vital assets in the north against airborne threats. About 10 billion shekels can further strengthen Israel’s main air defenses, and 10 billion more can strengthen strike capabilities, to deter and restrain. An additional 10-20 billion shekels can go toward the modernization and advancement of tactical equipment for the ground forces. More is required, but industrial production is limited.
The above summarizes demand for force modernization and buildup, additional to the approved budget, amounting to about 60-70 billion shekels ($16.4-$19.2 billion). If we spread that out over two years (as emergency preparations for war must be made soon), this constitutes an increase of approximately 35 billion shekels ($9.6 billion) per year. This is far from the 20% of GDP that would be required over decades to implement the “big army” approach. At about 7-7.5% of GDP for two, maybe three years, it is far from even the 10% threshold, which is reasonable for a nation fighting for its life. Focusing on modernization, rather than on a huge increase in the force, would prevent long-term permanent consequences to the budget that would have exact a heavy price in terms of Israel’s standard of living and national debt.
Conclusion
We are so caught up in the current fighting that we are not seeing the big picture.
We are nine months into a war of attrition in the north. The IDF is growing more and more depleted, exhausted and exposed. We are learning quite a bit, but not in a way that changes the situation. Hezbollah, on the other hand, is learning plenty, especially the secrets of our air defense; filling up on materiel from Iranian warehouses; and growing stronger all the time. This situation must be reversed.
Once most of the potential of the Iron Swords War has been exhausted, Israel’s strategic concept should see the next campaign as the center of gravity. We have only just woken up to the fact that we are in the midst of a 30-year war, if indeed we prevail in the next round.
We must focus on preparing the IDF for a decisive round in the north in two years. Breakthrough thinking is required, entailing the elimination of all bureaucratic barriers to the approval of sweeping and exceptional budgets. Above all, a proper strategy is required. No traumatic reactions from the hip.
Churchill realized in 1940 that the building of the army could not be left in the sole hands of his generals. The British needed a fresh approach to the war. Israel today needs a fresh approach to war, not Pavlovian and expensive reactions that are just more of the same.
Whatever the approach to preparing for war, we must act. We must bring back the hostages, look past the current operations, and prepare for the Israeli-Iranian showdown, mainly—but not solely—in Lebanon. Israel needs a strategy, and it needs it now.
Originally published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.