As Israel continues to face challenges on several fronts, it must also watch its relations with Egypt and Jordan, its two longest-standing peace partners.
Both countries face domestic and regional pressures, and some of their recent policies are troubling from an Israeli perspective. Still, there’s no reason at present to expect the peace agreements to collapse or either country to turn toward military confrontation.
Relations with both states have endured, especially in the security and infrastructure spheres, even as public attitudes remain deeply hostile. At the same time, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are seeking to reshape the regional balance and draw Egypt and Jordan closer into their orbit.
Egypt has not joined the mutual-defense agreement signed in Mecca and says it is maintaining a balanced policy, but its military cooperation with Turkey is deepening. Only a few years ago, Cairo saw Ankara as a serious ideological and strategic rival. Turkey is now seeking to draw Egypt into a grouping some have begun calling STEP, for Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan.
Jordan, meanwhile, has moved closer to the new regime in Syria and taken positions in the international arena that Israel views as increasingly problematic.
Even so, Israel still shares important interests with both countries. Tehran has long sought to destabilize Jordan and turn Judea and Samaria into a “second Gaza,” while attacks on Egyptian energy infrastructure fit its broader effort to disrupt the global energy economy. Egypt and Jordan also share Israel’s interest in preventing Hamas from rebuilding its position in Gaza or taking control of the Palestinian Authority.
Both remain partly dependent on infrastructure links with Israel. Jordan relies on Israeli water supplies, while Egypt receives Israeli gas. Egypt also benefits from exports to the United States under the Qualifying Industrial Zones arrangement, which requires Israeli inputs in Egyptian industrial production.
A cold peace that still functions
Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan remain very different from its warmer ties with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco under the Abraham Accords. With Cairo and Amman, relations are largely confined to government, security and limited business channels.
Public hostility remains strong in both countries, reinforced by the current war and by civil-society organizations and professional associations that oppose normalization. Yet cooperation continues where both sides have practical interests.
Israeli gas now supplies about one-sixth of Egypt’s national consumption and helps support an economy under serious pressure. Under the QIZ framework, Egyptian manufacturers also retain access to U.S. tariff benefits when their products contain a required proportion of Israeli inputs.
Jordan has its own free trade agreement with the United States, but water remains a major point of dependence. The kingdom has very limited water resources and a rapidly growing population. Water arrangements anchored in the peace treaty and later agreements therefore remain significant.
The Israeli embassies in Egypt and Jordan operate mainly from Jerusalem because of security threats, but security and intelligence contacts remain active. Egyptian and Jordanian representatives are also participating in the Civil-Military Coordination Center in Kiryat Gat under an American umbrella, including in coordination over the planned International Stabilization Force in Gaza.
Egypt: friction and shared interests
Egypt’s basic diplomatic positions toward Israel haven’t changed. Cairo continues to emphasize Palestinian rights, criticize Israeli military actions and periodically call for Israel’s nuclear facilities to be opened to inspection. In international forums, it often supports or leads measures critical of Israel.
The more immediate concern is whether Egypt could eventually join the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed on Aug. 7, 2026, by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. Egypt has already participated in military exercises with Turkey, and the two countries have taken a common position opposing Israel’s strategic presence in Somaliland.
Such a move could raise questions about Egypt’s commitments under the 1979 peace treaty, including the provision giving that agreement precedence over other obligations. Some concerns in Israel have been amplified by outside actors such as Qatar, but there is no indication that Egypt is preparing for a surprise attack or seeking to violate the treaty. The deepening relationship with Turkey does, however, warrant close attention.
Egypt and Israel also continue to share significant strategic interests. Iran’s attack on the gas facility at Damietta showed that Egypt has become a target of Tehran’s efforts to disrupt the global energy economy. Israel has a direct interest in preventing similar attacks because of its own energy links with Egypt.
Renewed Houthi activity in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait also threatens both countries. For Egypt, disruption of Suez Canal traffic damages a major source of foreign currency. For Israel, it threatens strategic shipping routes. Egypt has so far avoided overt involvement against the Houthis, but renewed fighting in Yemen could alter its calculations.
Gaza is another area of overlapping interests. Egypt opposes many Israeli policies there, but it also has a clear interest in preventing Hamas, as a Muslim Brotherhood movement, from regaining control. Despite disagreements over the 15-point Board of Peace Roadmap for Gaza, there may still be room for coordination over Cairo’s role as a logistical rear during the initial stages of a gradual framework aimed at creating alternatives for part of Gaza’s population.
Jordan: growing tensions, continuing coordination
Jordan’s ties with Israel have also cooled sharply. King Abdullah II’s 2019 decision to reclaim border areas leased to Israelis for 25 years marked an important shift. The last meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Jordanian king took place in early 2023. Since then, Abdullah has taken an increasingly hostile public line, particularly over fears that Israeli policy could lead to the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza or Judea and Samaria.
Jordan’s policy toward Syria has also raised concerns. Although the kingdom has been relatively successful in suppressing jihadist activity at home, it did little to assist during serious violence in the Druze region of Sweida despite its proximity. Closer ties between Amman and Damascus could also increase Turkish influence if the Mecca Pact expands to other Sunni states.
Another point of friction is Jordan’s treatment of people involved in terrorism. Ahlam al-Tamimi, convicted for her role in the Jerusalem Sbarro bombing and released in a 2011 prisoner-exchange deal, was told to leave Jordan in early 2025 but wasn’t extradited to the United States and continues to live and operate there.
Despite those tensions, security cooperation remains important. Jordan worked under U.S. Central Command to help intercept Iranian missile, cruise-missile and UAV attacks aimed at Israel in 2024, 2025 and 2026. Jordan has itself come under Iranian attack because of the American military presence on its territory.
Jordan also has an interest in preventing its territory from becoming a base for terrorism and arms smuggling. It has been more successful against terrorism than smuggling, making continued coordination between the security forces especially important.
Like Egypt, Jordan has a long-term interest in preventing Hamas from ruling Gaza or taking control of the Palestinian population in the West Bank. It also has a less openly stated interest in Israel continuing to view the Jordan Valley as a strategic barrier.
Jerusalem creates another area of overlapping interest. Under the peace treaty, the Hashemite monarchy has a special role regarding Muslim holy sites on the Temple Mount. A future Palestinian government could challenge or strip the king of that role, giving Jordan an interest in preserving the current political status quo.
What Israel should do
Preserving the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan remains a vital Israeli interest, even as some of their policies cause concern.
Israel should avoid steps that would push Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi or Jordan’s King Abdullah II into positions that run even more sharply against Israel under domestic pressure. At the same time, it should work with regional and international partners to restore high-level diplomatic channels and reassure both governments about Israeli intentions toward the Palestinian population.
Israel should also make clear, particularly to Egypt, the long-term risks of moving too deeply into Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s orbit. Friends in the eastern Mediterranean may be able to reinforce that message.
Infrastructure ties remain another source of leverage. In the short term, unresolved arrangements can influence behavior. Over the longer term, deeper Egyptian and Jordanian dependence on Israel in key infrastructure areas serves Israel’s strategic interests.
Washington remains important as well. Even if U.S. President Donald Trump is reluctant to pressure governments he sees as allies, Congress can still discreetly remind Cairo and Amman that the scale of U.S. military assistance is tied to their continued commitment to peace with Israel.
The relationships are cold and increasingly strained, but they still rest on durable security, economic and strategic interests that Israel has strong reasons to preserve.
This is an edited version of an article that first appeared in the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
