The Institute for Science and National Security issued its “Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report: May 2025” by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard and Spencer August Faragasso on June 9, 2025. The report cited an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report dated May 31, 2025, that Iran’s stockpile of 60% highly enriched uranium (HEU) amounted to 233 kg.
Two weeks ago, the IAEA reported a slight increase of 60% HEU to 440.9 kilograms, enough to yield approximately 10 nuclear weapons. The finding reported that it would take only two to three days to produce 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium (WGU), which is 90% material. This amount of U-235 is a bit more than the 22 kilograms of critical mass of U-235 needed to trigger a nuclear explosion.
The 90% meme, however, is a bit of a myth. The Hiroshima bomb was 80% material, but merely required a larger device than what is put on modern missiles to be effective, and there is more than one way to deliver a nuke. An 80% bomb can be flown by a jet plane or loaded onto an ocean freighter. A 90% bomb does not need to be fitted to an ICBM. Intermediate-range missiles launched from ships mid-ocean will more than suffice.
The disturbing fact is that Iran potentially has at least 35 nukes. Almost no one mentions its 20% enriched material, and no one is talking about its 5% trove.
To put Iran’s stash of enriched nuclear material in perspective: Reactor-grade material is only 3.87% enriched, but that is not as far away from WGU as it seems. Yellowcake is predominantly U-238. The fissionable isotope of uranium U-235 is only 0.7% of the raw yellowcake, but by the time the ore is processed to a concentrate of 3.87%, it is actually 75% of its way to 90% material.
That alone is reason to require that Iran not undertake any enrichment whatsoever. Iran has exercised its “right to enrich” to establish itself as a threshold existential global threat. It should not be allowed to continue.
Converting 20% or 60% nuclear material to 90% is a small step for Iran and a giant threat to Western civilization. How small? Twenty percent material is 90% of the way to 90%; 60% is 99% there.
According to the IAEA, as of June 13, 2025, Iran’s enriched U-235 stockpiles comprised a total of 9,875 kilograms. Enrichment levels are 2,391 kilograms at 2% (two nukes); 6,024 kilograms at 5% (13 nukes); 441 kilograms at 60% (10 nukes); 184 kilograms at 20% (1.5 nukes); and 834 kilograms of other “types” (unknown).
No one is talking about the real status of Iran’s HEU stockpile. It should be asked why Iran has so much HEU and no bomb. It is because Iran was finalizing the work on “weaponization.” This weaponization was obviously delayed for Iran to slowly, step by step, one violation of the 2015 nuclear deal after another, build up its inventory so when it weaponized, it would not merely test its “first nuke.”
Instead, it would demonstrate its achievement backed up by another three dozen bombs or more. The plan was the nuclear version of Iran’s conventional ballistic-missile shield policy: Make it so massive that Iran is immune from attack.
None of this HEU should be described as “nuclear dust.” “Dust” downplays the nature of the material and makes light of the gravity of a rogue state in control of a large amount of nuclear bomb material. The phrase is another example of the Trump administration undermining its own credibility and lacking control of its vocabulary.
The regime’s sole concern is its own survival, so it can continue to pursue its fanatical religious war against Western civilization.
Americans need to understand what is at stake and not be annoyed or distracted by nattering foolishness. The situation calls for the gravamen of President John F. Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
There is no public information on how much of the HEU is in its gaseous hexafluoride (UHF) state or in its metallic bomb-grade state. We do not know how much of the HEU is properly containerized, how much is in centrifuges, how much is in processing from UHF to the solid metal state or how much may have been blown out of its various containers during the bombing campaign. We do not know how radioactive some of these environments may now be.
It will take a large contingent of technical specialists many months to retrieve and transfer all these materials—60%, 20% 5% and 2%, gaseous and metallic—out of Iran. There will have to be a larger contingent of “boots on the ground,” like it or not, to guard the technicians. Moreover, there is likely a substantial amount of yellowcake that has been staged to begin processing.
And what about Iran’s uranium mines? Are these going to be closed?
The talk of “down blending”—reducing the enrichment level of nuclear material—is problematic for several reasons. “Blended” material can be centrifuged again or otherwise processed back to its original concentration.
The talk of “destroying” the material is not as simple as it sounds. If treated as radioactive waste, it can be glassified and made stable. This is done by blending the HEU with glass-forming materials (silica SiO2/silicon dioxide and boron oxide, called “frit beads”) and heating it to 1,000 to 1,150 degrees Celsius (2,100 degrees Fahrenheit). The mass is then poured into thick, stainless steel (quite expensive) containers to cool and solidify into “glass logs.” This can be done at Hanford, Wash., or Savannah River, S.C. In other words, after very careful containerization, the material would have to be transported to the United States. The cost and time required would be significant.
Imagine having to excavate the underground sites that were hit with the massive GBU-57 bunker busters. How long would the work take, and what would be the cost and scale of it? Yet, the HEU cannot be left there because if Iran, even five or 10 years from now, finds a way to retrieve it, who is going to stop them, especially if they hide the project? It should be assumed that the regime will restart its nuclear enterprise in secret.
If the material is brought to the United States, it could be properly stored and made available for nuclear power generation. But it must not be left in Iran.
Moreover, Tehran cannot be expected to agree to a large contingent of technicians and troops swarming all over its nuclear sites, retrieving the nuclear material that it has no intention of giving up to begin with. To agree to this would be for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to forsake its religious mission.
In the meantime, the idea that Iran can retain any of this material for any amount of time while “negotiations” drag on presents the risk of Iran manufacturing dirty bombs, the “terrorist’s nuke.”
Iran should have no access to nuclear material other than imports for medical uses. It should not be allowed any processing whatsoever. The jump from low-grade to HEU is too easy once “mere” reactor grade is reached.
In addition, the Bashir reactor has not been addressed. It should be decommissioned because it is a plutonium risk. Also not addressed are Iran’s chemical and biological weapons programs, as well as its ballistic-missile program.
The situation calls for the gravamen of President John F. Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
The only prediction that can be made with assurance is that the Iranian regime will not live up to any “expectations.” It is critical to understand that the regime does not look out for its “national interests.” The late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 radical Shia revolution that created Iran’s Islamic regime, denounced nationalism as a form of idolatry.
Instead, Khomeini’s regime is about global Islamist revolution coupled with a putative communist economy, of which the IRGC has seized control in the style of mafia gangsters. The IRGC is dedicated to the survival of the regime it controls and the continuation of its “Shia revolution.” The United States needs to stop pretending it is dealing with the “nation” of Iran. It is dealing with fanatically committed ideologues.
Iran’s own population is part of its hostage-taking strategy, along with the Gulf region and the global economy. The regime’s sole concern is its own survival, so it can continue to pursue its fanatical religious war against Western civilization. It seeks the destruction of Israel and the defeat, if not destruction, of the United States and Europe. Yet what should have been the most important war the United States has fought since World War II has descended into chaos.
What is it about these genocidal fanatics that the Trump administration does not understand? Why does it fail to make its case to the country, if not the world?
If the Iranian regime ever goes nuclear and finds itself in danger of being overthrown, what are the odds that it would use its nukes and take down whoever it wants with it? What do “Death to America,” “Death to Israel, “Death to the Great Satan,” “Death to the Little Satan” actually mean? Apparently, most people outside of Iran and Israel do not take the slightest notice of it.
In the end, it’s not just Iran’s nuclear ambitions that need to be thwarted, but also the regime itself. Thus, the United States should vet, arm and train a domestic insurgency.
Stay tuned. There will be more contradictory actions and statements to come, along with the chaos they create. One can only hope that the Iranian regime is so compulsive and impulsive that its hubris leads to its ultimate demise. One can only hope.
