On Jan. 9, 2025, Gen. Joseph Aoun was elected the 14th president of Lebanon, marking the end of nearly three years of effort by the country’s two Shi’ite organizations, Amal and Hezbollah, to promote their preferred candidate, Suleiman Frangieh, at the cost of paralyzing Lebanon’s political system.
Four days later, Judge Nawaf Salam, president of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, was elected Lebanon’s prime minister by a majority vote—contrary to the stance of Amal and Hezbollah, who sought to extend the tenure of caretaker prime minister Najib Mikati. In response, Nabih Berri, Parliament Speaker and leader of the Shi’ite Amal movement, stated, “This is not what we agreed upon.”
Both organizations attempted to create the impression that Aoun owed them his presidency. During the first round of voting in Parliament, Shi’ite representatives cast blank ballots. They used the break announced by Berri to meet with Aoun before joining the second round of voting, in which he received 99 votes.
Subsequently, Lebanese media reported that the Finance Ministry would be allocated to a Shi’ite representative in the new government in exchange for Shi’ite support from both organizations.
When they realized they could not secure the election of their candidate, Mikati, Berri and Hezbollah representatives in Parliament chose not to vote for any candidate for prime minister. The offended Shi’ite bloc expressed resentment over the election outcome, hinting at possible retaliatory measures without elaborating—further heightening sectarian tensions in Lebanon.
This marks Hezbollah’s fourth major setback since it declared its support for Hamas on Oct. 8, 2023, further demonstrating the organization’s weakening position. Moreover, significant changes seem to be occurring within Lebanon’s Shi’ite community and Hezbollah itself.
Hizbullah’s miscalculations
Former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who considered himself the ultimate authority on Israel, assumed that the war-torn and weakened state would not dare confront the terrorist group. This miscalculation cost him his life, along with the lives of most of Hezbollah’s senior leadership. It also led to an unprecedented ceasefire agreement, brokered by Hezbollah’s “big brother,” Berri.
Hezbollah had hoped Israel would be drawn into southern Lebanon and fall into its trap. Instead, Israel focused on dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, taking advantage of the strategic surprise of disrupting Hezbollah’s communications systems, which crippled its leadership. Hezbollah had not anticipated the depth of Israel’s intelligence infiltration—and paid a heavy price.
Furthermore, no one, including Hezbollah, expected Bashar al-Assad’s regime to fall in just 11 days, only to be replaced by a government hostile to Iran and Hezbollah. The fall of the Alawite regime severed Hezbollah’s physical connection to Iran, cutting a critical supply line and ending Hezbollah’s military presence in Syria, which had served as a weapons storage facility and a site for producing precision-guided munitions.
The presidential battle in Lebanon
Hezbollah was caught off guard when Frangieh withdrew his candidacy just 24 hours before the vote. Left without an alternative, the two Shi’ite organizations were forced to support a candidate backed by the United States, France, Saudi Arabia and Qatar—none of whom are allies of Hezbollah.
What will Hezbollah do next?
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s statements clearly show that the terrorist group does not intend to abandon its mission. The group is waiting to see Israel’s next steps after the ceasefire expires.
If Israel remains in Lebanese territory without the approval of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah may adopt the same strategy it used before the Israel Defense Forces’ withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000—launching a guerrilla war against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah will argue that since the Lebanese army is unable to fight Israel, the “resistance” must take on the task.
However, the organization seems to ignore the fact that under current circumstances, Israel will not restrain its operations to Southern Lebanon.
This sentiment was reflected in a heated meeting between Hezbollah’s liaison to the Lebanese Armed Forces, Wafiq Safa, and Aoun. During the meeting, Safa attempted to persuade Aoun to accept several of Hezbollah’s symbolic positions while allowing the organization to maintain control over its facilities and weapons depots. However, Aoun refused.
At this stage, Hezbollah and Amal’s grip on Lebanon’s political system has weakened significantly. Their strategy could involve non-cooperation with Lebanese government institutions—even to the point of sabotaging critical reforms necessary for the country’s recovery.
Furthermore, if, as stated by U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, Israel withdraws from Southern Lebanon as per the ceasefire agreement, it would serve as further proof of the irrelevance of the “resistance” and mark the beginning of Hezbollah’s decline as an independent force outside Iran’s control.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.