Given the fraught nature of U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations over the last decade, spanning both the current Biden administration and the first Trump administration, the outcome of the 2024 U.S. elections presented Ankara with a dilemma.
The bones of contention between the two nations have been numerous: American concerns about the erosion of Turkish democracy, particularly restrictions imposed on freedom of speech; Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 air-defense system; the American recognition of the Armenian Genocide; Washington’s refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen; U.S. support for the Kurdish PYD-YPG in northern Syria; Turkey’s initial opposition to Sweden and Finland joining NATO; Turkey’s membership in BRICS; and, most recently, Ankara’s unprecedented pro-Hamas stance.
With so many significant disagreements, it is difficult to envision a promising future for U.S.-Turkish relations.
U.S.-Turkish relations under the Biden-Harris administration
Before Joe Biden’s inauguration as president, his campaign openly challenged Turkey and its president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In a letter sent to the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) on Sept. 16, 2019, Biden pledged to support the official recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Additionally, during a closed session in December 2019, Biden referred to Erdoğan as an “autocrat” and revealed his intention to support efforts to replace him with another leader through democratic elections. Unsurprisingly, these remarks provoked strong protests from Ankara. These events set the stage for a cold and contentious relationship.
Biden’s attitude towards Turkey remained unchanged after becoming president in January 2021. Consistent with his earlier statements, on April 24, Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, Biden fulfilled his promise by officially recognizing the 1915 Armenian Genocide. The Biden-Harris administration’s critical stance toward Erdogan became even more evident when the White House excluded the Turkish president from the 2021 Summit for Democracy, indirectly criticizing Turkey for its deteriorating democracy and restrictions on freedom of speech. Biden also didn’t invite Erdoğan to the White House, nor did he plan a visit to Turkey during his term.
Turkey’s record on democracy and its foreign policy approach raised concerns in Washington. Adopting an “independent foreign policy doctrine,” first demonstrated during the 2010 U.N. Security Council vote on sanctions against Iran, Turkey voted against Western expectations and aligned itself with Tehran. Later, it circumvented sanctions through its state-owned Halkbank, an action that eventually became the subject of a lawsuit in U.S. courts.
Parallel to that stance, after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Ankara refrained from joining the sanctions regime against Russia and once again pursued an “independent foreign policy.” While this turned Turkey into a hub for Russian flights and money, Ankara’s foreign policy cannot be labeled as pro-Russian. Erdoğan on numerous occasions stressed Turkey’s unequivocal support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In addition to verbal support, Turkey provided Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs to the Ukrainian army, and these drones inflicted considerable damage on Russian forces, particularly in the early stages of the war.
Turkey’s ambivalence was also evident within NATO. Although Turkey eventually approved membership for Finland and Sweden, it created obstacles throughout the admission process for these Scandinavian states. In retrospect, it is clear that Turkey leveraged NATO enlargement to circumvent the 2017 U.S. CAATSA sanctions against its military industry, triggered by Ankara’s acquisition of Russian-made S-400 anti-ballistic missiles. The acquisition placed Turkey in the category of “U.S. opponent”—a status that requires sanctions under U.S. law. On April 6, 2021, the sanctions were officially enacted. Three weeks later, on April 21, Turkey was officially removed from the F-35 program. As a result of these sanctions, Turkey not only lost the opportunity to acquire F-35s but was also prohibited from purchasing any American military technology, including F-16s.
Although Turkey publicly denied any linkage, Ankara effectively leveraged Sweden and Finland’s NATO admission to secure new F-16s as replacements for the F-35s. Finally, after Finland and Sweden’s admission to the alliance, and despite CAATSA, the United States approved the F-16 deal with Ankara on Jan. 27 of this year. Though the parties ultimately found common ground, the process underscored their mutual mistrust.
U.S.-Turkish relations in Trump’s first term
President Donald Trump’s relationship with Turkey was altogether different. During his presidency (2017 to 2021), Erdoğan visited the White House twice and was effectively excused by Trump for his decision to purchase the S-400 systems. Notably, during the 2019 G20 summit, Trump openly blamed the Obama administration for the Turkish-Russian rapprochement.
Despite the warm dialogue, Trump, in contrast to Biden, became the first U.S. president to impose five separate sanctions on the Turkish government. These sanctions targeted the ministries of interior, justice and defense, as well as the ministers of interior and justice personally, along with officials from Turkish Defense Industries in their individual capacity.
Additionally, Trump signed an order to increase tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Turkey, inflicting significant damage to the Turkish economy. Trump also made remarkable threats on Twitter “to ruin the Turkish economy,” in response to Turkey’s detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson and its military operation against the Kurdish PYD-YPG in northern Syria.
On Nov. 6, Erdoğan officially congratulated Trump, emphasizing their personal relationship by referring to him as his “friend,” and expressing his wish to strengthen bilateral ties. The Turkish president demonstrated his appreciation for maintaining personal dialogue channels, a stark contrast to Biden’s cold-shoulder approach.
However, despite Erdoğan’s desire to strengthen bilateral ties, significant challenges remain. Turkey’s attempts to join BRICS, an organization that seeks to challenge American dominance in international trade through de-dollarization, as well as Ankara’s unprecedented pro-Hamas stance against the State of Israel, will likely pose substantial obstacles.
Erdoğan appears to be aware of these complexities. Indeed, the Turkish president has acknowledged that improving relations depends not only on presidents but also on the influence of their cabinets.
As nominations to key positions in the U.S. government take shape, the outlook appears increasingly bleak for Erdoğan. Tulsi Gabbard, one of the fiercest critics of Erdoğan’s Turkey, has become the new director of U.S. National Intelligence. In a statement before assuming office, Gabbard accused Turkey of supporting jihadists and openly labeled Erdoğan “one of the most dangerous dictators in the world,” underlining that she does not see the Turkish president as a friend.
This sentiment is shared by the new U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio. On various occasions in the past, Rubio has criticized Erdoğan for his policies on the Kurds in northern Syria, as well as for Turkey’s poor record on freedom of speech and human rights. Rubio has demanded the release of political prisoners such as Osman Kavala, who was accused of plotting a coup against the government for organizing the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Last but not least, the staunchly pro-Israel nominee for secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, has openly stated his worldview by declaring “Zionism and Americanism are today the front lines of Western civilization and freedom.” This is a clear message regarding Ankara’s anti-Israel policies.
Ankara is watching these developments closely. During a press conference Erdoğan’s AKP spokesperson, Omer Celik, stressed that his government is forming a road map for enhancing relations with their new American counterparts. Celik also expressed his hope that previous statements made by incoming U.S. officials would not negatively impact bilateral relations.
Prospects for the future
In international relations, the personal values, beliefs and opinions of decision-makers impact policymaking and relations between states. Unless Turkey makes adjustments in its foreign policy, particularly regarding BRICS and Israel, Celik’s remarks will remain nothing more than wishful thinking. As a NATO member, Turkey’s increasing and ironic alignment with the Russian-Chinese axis, including its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits, is viewed unfavorably in Washington, as is its growing interest BRICS, an economic bloc that seeks to challenge U.S. global influence.
At the same time, Ankara’s pro-Hamas stance and the fact that it allows Hamas to use its territory for terrorist activities will inevitably become a significant obstacle to U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations. Turkey’s foreign-policy divergence away from U.S. preferences will limit Ankara’s maneuverability in northern Syria. Despite Turkish expectations, it seems that the new Trump administration will most likely not withdraw its troops from northern Syria, adding further tensions to the relationship.
Donald Trump’s latest statements about his desire to end all wars suggest that Ukraine may be the only arena where Turkey can align with U.S. interests. Turkey’s ambivalent policy in the conflict positions it as a potential mediator capable of brokering a ceasefire in Ukraine, thus offering Ankara a rare opportunity to please Washington.
Conclusion
The future of U.S.-Turkish relations remains highly uncertain, shaped by profound disagreements and competing priorities. While Erdoğan has expressed a willingness to strengthen ties, Turkey’s foreign policy—particularly its engagement with BRICS, pro-Hamas stance, and continued ambivalence toward NATO—poses significant challenges. The Trump administration, if consistent with its first-term approach, may maintain a transactional relationship with Ankara but is unlikely to make concessions on critical issues such as northern Syria or Israel, especially given the ideological positions of the new U.S. cabinet.
To navigate this turbulent landscape, Turkey must carefully recalibrate its policies, balancing its strategic autonomy with the necessity of fostering constructive dialogue with Washington. Without meaningful adjustments, Ankara risks further alienation, narrowing its diplomatic options and exacerbating tensions in an already fraught bilateral relationship. At the same time, Turkey’s potential role as a mediator in Ukraine offers a rare opportunity to improve its standing with the United States, provided it can capitalize on its unique position in the conflict.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.