Governments in many world capitals have repeatedly expressed apprehension about escalation of the Gaza conflict and Hezbollah’s war of attrition against Israel. They fear greater violence, more casualties and an expansion of the number of regional participants. President Joe Biden sent aircraft carriers to the region, signaling his desire to prevent escalation, and repeated on several occasions his famous warning, “Don’t”—with limited success.
Such fears, warnings and the many calls for restraint are understandable, particularly for Western audiences, but they are not very useful. First, these pronouncements express genuine reluctance to use force and are seen by most people in the Middle East as weakness—a trait despised in these parts. In contrast to the Western attitude that the use of force is uncivilized and anachronistic, Middle Easterners see it as a legitimate option in the toolbox of international actors.
Moreover, it is popular. Hamas gained huge popularity among Palestinians for its Oct. 7 attack on Israel. Israelis cherish successful targeted killings, and these are also well appreciated by its Arab allies.
In many situations, climbing the escalation ladder is probably the best way to put an end to violence. Indeed, the Hamas raids and atrocities are a direct result of Israel’s years-long containment policy. Instead of escalating to change Hamas’s strategic calculus, Israel preferred to absorb attacks and refrained from a strong riposte. This only gave Hamas time to build its military capabilities and acquire the might to withstand an Israeli offensive now in its tenth month.
Similarly, Israel’s reluctance to preempt in Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to build a formidable missile arsenal. This organization grew to become a monster that since Oct. 8 has conducted, undeterred, a war of attrition against Israel. With Iran’s blessing, it succeeded in emptying the north of Israel of its residents and in forcing the Israel Defense Forces to deploy large military formations south of the Lebanese border that are needed to attain a faster victory in Gaza.
Attrition warfare is the best outcome for the population-centric Iranian strategy and the worst possible scenario for Israel. The continuous existence of over one hundred thousand missiles in the hands of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is an intolerable situation for Israel. Only escalation intended to eliminate the missile arsenal can put an end to the war of attrition.
In the Lebanese case, the “diplomatic solution” the Americans and the French are pushing for is a mirage. Hezbollah cannot be trusted to abide for long to any agreement that does not serve its ends, and the United Nations contingent in Southern Lebanon assigned to prevent the Hezbollah encroachment on the Israeli border has proved its impotence.
War against Hezbollah is inevitable; Israel might have to wait for more hospitable circumstances—but they will come.
Readiness to escalate and bear additional costs signals determination to attain necessary goals. Victory in war is achieved not only by the greater ability to exact costs from the enemy, but no less by the capability to withstand pain and suffering.
Therefore, being perceived as having a predilection for escalation helps deterrence. Fear of retaliation has a cooling effect on many tempers all over the world. Unfortunately, the Middle East is a tough neighborhood. Deterrence must be maintained over time by the occasional use of force. This is its only lubricant—not words.
Risk avoidance is lauded in many circles and international situations. Yet restraint in the strategic arena is problematic. It could be construed as a fatal weakness, and might invite aggression. This is the way the bullies read things. Particularly the Middle East variety.
Each situation obviously requires a separate calculation of opportunities and risks. But the Pavlovian advice to act with restraint, and warnings about escalation, indicate a lack of understanding of the strategic game played by the violent Middle Eastern actors. Words such as goodwill, trust and stability have a different meaning when employed by the radicals in the region. Iran and its proxies want to destabilize it. They all want the United States out of the Middle East, and for America’s allies to fall and be substituted by radical Islamists.
They cannot be persuaded to refrain from scheming against the West and its regional allies. Diplomacy has little value. Westerners who worship the sanctity of life are not sufficiently aware that Islamist radicals are ready to make many sacrifices and to bear a great deal of pain. Iran has been under economic sanctions of various intensity for decades with little impact on its policies.
In the final analysis, the only effective persuasion is the use of force. This requires willingness to escalate the struggle for freedom and other Western values. Islamist radicals need to be defeated. The timing of escalation can be debated but not the course of action.
Originally published by The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.