While international attention was riveted by Israel’s high-stakes campaign against Iran during “Operation Rising Lion,” the Israel Defense Forces simultaneously escalated its operations in Gaza.
Military commanders used the Iran operation not as a distraction, but as cover, intensifying maneuvers in Khan Yunis, Rafah and Jabalia while the global spotlight looked east.
In recent weeks, IDF units uncovered dozens of tunnel shafts in Rafah, destroyed Hamas weapons depots hidden in residential areas, and carried out targeted strikes that killed senior field commanders in Gaza City.
In central Gaza, the 98th Division launched a limited campaign in Deir al-Balah, a strategically critical outskirt of the yet unconquered Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps, where many hostages are believed to be kept.
According to military figures, 21 soldiers were killed in Gaza in June alone, three times as many as in May and seven times the toll in April, underscoring the increased intensity and scale of the fighting.
With Hezbollah largely deterred in the north, Syria in strategic collapse, and Iran’s long-range missile and nuclear infrastructure severely degraded, Hamas in Gaza now stands as the final active front of the war.
“As you probably know, many opportunities have opened up now following this victory. Firstly, to rescue the hostages. Of course, we will also need to solve the Gaza issue, defeat Hamas, but I believe we will accomplish both missions,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday.
Israel now has greater operational freedom to concentrate military resources on Gaza.
During “Operation Rising Lion, the IDF was forced to reduce airstrike frequency in the Strip to preserve aerial assets for a potential multi-front escalation.
That constraint has now been lifted. Fighter squadrons and drones previously allocated to Iran contingency missions are once again supporting tactical operations in Rafah, Khan Yunis and central Gaza.
Artillery and precision-guided munitions, stockpiled in case of direct conflict with Iranian missile forces, are being deployed more freely against Hamas infrastructure.
“There is a noticeable difference in the past weeks in the rate of artillery fire and airstrikes, and other operations,” Lt. M., a combat officer stationed in Khan Yunis, told JNS.
“Things are definitely winding up, and from the other officers I’m talking to in Rafah, in Netzarim, and in the north [of Gaza], this is happening all over Gaza,” he added.
Even command attention has shifted. Senior IDF planners, who spent recent weeks managing parallel war theaters, are now focused squarely on Gaza, where the core objectives of hostage recovery and Hamas dismantlement remain unresolved.
75% of the Strip
Speaking on a visit to the Gaza Strip with senior officers, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir said that “Iran took a heavy blow. There is potential that the blow caused to Iran will advance our goals in Gaza. In the near future, we will reach the lines we defined for the current phase within the framework of ‘Gideon’s Chariots.’”
The official goal of the “Gideon’s Chariots” offensive is for the IDF to assert military control over 75% of the Gaza Strip.
“From there, operational options will develop that will be presented to the political echelon. The IDF will continue to act with determination to achieve the two objectives of the campaign, the release of the hostages and the defeat of Hamas,” Zamir added.
With Gaza now the primary front in Israel’s war effort, Hamas finds itself cut off from its most powerful external sponsor.
Historically, Iran’s Quds Force underpinned Hamas with weapons, training, financial support and tunnel-construction expertise, providing up to $350 million annually, according to Israeli security assessments.
Captured Hamas documents revealed that leaders Yahya Sinwar and Muhammad Deif even requested $500 million from Iran in 2021 to prepare for the Oct. 7, 2023, offensive. But Iran’s external capabilities have been severely degraded since the start of “Operation Rising Lion.”
On June 21, the IDF killed Brig. Gen. Saeed Izadi, head of the Quds Force’s Palestine Corps, in a precision strike in Qom, neutralizing the man directly responsible for Hamas arms and funding. In the same operation, Behnam Shahriyari, commander of Unit 190 (the weapons-transfer unit feeding Hamas, Hezbollah and other proxies), was also eliminated.
“Izadi funded and armed Hamas ahead of the October 7 massacre. This is a huge win for Israeli intelligence and the Air Force, justice for the murdered and the hostages,” Defense Minister Israel Katz said after the assassination.
The removal of both figures delivered a decisive blow to Iran’s proxy network. At the same time, Iran faces internal instability, with protests around the corner, regime purges underway, and a weakened Revolutionary Guard struggling to reassert control.
Under these conditions, Tehran’s capacity to support Hamas has been severely diminished, leaving the group more exposed and alone than at any point in the war.
“Without serious Iranian backing, Hamas’s chances go significantly down. If Israel is persistent, this can be leveraged militarily into the expulsion of Hamas leadership or military victory and a resolution for Gaza,” Former Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, chairman of the Silver Road Capital financial advisory firm, told JNS.
A Palestinian official close to Hamas told Reuters last week that “Operation Rising Lion” will impact “the shape of funding and the expertise Iran used to give to the resistance and Hamas.”
The ‘Axis of Resistance’
The erosion of Iranian support for Hamas is not only material, but also ideological. The decapitation of Iran’s proxy leadership and the paralysis of the Quds Force’s Palestine Corps have left Hamas operationally isolated. But just as significant is the symbolic collapse of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
For years, Iran has positioned itself as the ideological and logistical anchor of an anti-Israel front stretching from Tehran to Beirut to Gaza.
That narrative, of a transnational Islamic resistance capable of defeating Israel through persistent violence, has been deeply undermined.
Iran’s inability to respond meaningfully to Israeli strikes, the silence of Hezbollah and the collapse of Syria as a credible player all shatter the illusion that this crescent of influence remains coherent or threatening.
For Hamas, this collapse carries strategic consequences. Reduced financial and military support is compounded by a waning sense of ideological momentum. Recruitment efforts that once drew on the mythology of a pan-Islamic struggle against Israel now might face skepticism, especially as Sunni Arab states signal fatigue with Hamas’s methods.
Israeli sources report that the average age of Hamas fighters is “getting lower by the day,” signaling trouble with recruitment. The recent emergence of Hamas-opposed gangs led by Yasser Abu Shabab and others shows further cracks in Hamas’s control over Gaza.
As Iran reels and the “resistance axis” crumbles, Gaza’s non-Shia militants are left without ideological cover, strategic sponsorship or regional sympathy. The result is a battlefield force increasingly isolated in both resources and morale, fighting a war whose traditional regional backers have begun to move on.
“Hamas’s morale is likely significantly hit by the situation in Iran. This should affect the fighting in Gaza,” Ayalon said.
With more air power, ground units and command attention available to pursue military options in Gaza, Israel finds itself in a stronger position not only on the battlefield but also at the diplomatic table.
The perception of deepening strategic unity between Israel and the United States has been reinforced by their joint strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure during “Operation Rising Lion,” as well as the meeting set for July 7 between Prime Minister Netanyahu and U.S. President Trump.
This will be Netanyahu’s third visit to the White House this year, more than any other world leader. Trump’s frequent posts on Truth Social in support of Netanyahu, including calls to “end the persecution” of the prime minister, and calling him a “war hero,” further signal a close political alignment that grants Israel added diplomatic weight in Washington.
Wind down the war
At the same time, that unity empowers the U.S. to exert significant pressure on Israel to bring the war to a close. Trump has made no secret of his desire to wind down the conflict, especially in the wake of his administration’s participation in bombing Iran’s Fordow uranium enrichment facility.
“MAKE THE DEAL IN GAZA. GET THE HOSTAGES BACK!!! DJT,” he wrote in a Truth Social post this week. He is reportedly pushing for a 60-day ceasefire in exchange for the release of dozens of Israeli hostages, with negotiations expected to take center stage during the July 7 meeting.
This push represents both an opportunity and a constraint. While Israel enjoys unprecedented support, it is being asked to convert battlefield gains into a political settlement.
Emerging details of a potential post-war framework, as reported by Israel Hayom, suggest that Netanyahu and Trump are exploring a broader, permanent arrangement.
Under this proposal, the Hamas leadership would be exiled, and Gaza would be placed under a multinational Arab administration, potentially involving Egypt, the UAE or other moderate Sunni states.
Palestinian civilians would be resettled in safe zones, and international reconstruction efforts would begin under close Israeli and American oversight. This arrangement would not only end the war but also pave the way for expanding the Abraham Accords, folding Gaza into a wider regional normalization process.
Both leaders have hinted publicly at elements of the deal. Israeli sources confirmed that Netanyahu and Trump have held phone conversations in recent days, with Netanyahu reportedly agreeing in principle to a timeline for ending the war, provided key conditions are met, chiefly the elimination of Hamas’s military leadership and firm guarantees for long-term demilitarization.
Trump has echoed these themes, calling on Hamas to release hostages and accept a truce that could bring lasting change to Gaza’s governance structure.
The Prime Minister’s Office has sent mixed signals on the status of the negotiations. “The conversation that’s described in the article in Israel Hayom did not take place,” it said. “Israel was not presented with the political proposal supposedly described in the article, and it obviously did not agree to it,” a spokesman for the PMO said on Sunday.
On the other hand, a different spokesman for the PMO did admit that Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer was in Washington for preliminary negotiations. “He will try to press the Americans to press the Qataris to press Hamas, on a deal,” the spokesman explained. “We are hoping that there will be a breakthrough very soon. It depends on Hamas.”
The diplomatic momentum generated by the Iran strikes intersects with broader regional ambitions. With the Islamic Republic weakened, Hezbollah deterred and Syria sidelined, the Gaza war stands as the final obstacle to renewed Arab-Israeli normalization.
For both Israel and the United States, winding down the conflict is increasingly seen not only as a military necessity but as a gateway to strategic realignment in the Middle East.
“The war with Iran presents opportunities for expanding the Abraham Accords. Resolving the situation in Gaza will help that diplomatic process. But it is important to know that long-term, a good solution for Gaza is critical for Israel’s security, and getting that good result is still a complicated process,” Ayalon warned.