As the 60-day mark of the Israel–Lebanon truce agreement passed and a new deadline for withdrawal from Southern Lebanon by the Israel Defense Forces nears, key questions remain unanswered and challenges loom.
The ceasefire agreement Israel signed is inherently asymmetric. Under its terms, Israel is obligated to withdraw within 60 days (by Jan. 26), while the Lebanese Armed Forces are merely required to commence implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, an 18-year-old mandate that has never been fully enforced.
This imbalance raises critical concerns: Israel is held to a firm deadline, while Lebanon’s obligations remain vague, with no clear public benchmarks for disarmament or enforcement against Hezbollah.
Historically, Resolution 1701 has been a hollow promise.
It calls for the disarmament of illegitimate actors south of the Litani River in Southern Lebanon, yet Hezbollah has not only retained its arsenal but expanded it after 2006, the year the U.N. resolution was passed to end the Second Lebanon War. Despite sporadic deployments, the LAF has demonstrated neither the capacity nor the will to enforce the resolution meaningfully. The recent discovery of old, poorly maintained rockets purportedly seized by the LAF is emblematic of this failure. Such actions fall far short of the robust enforcement needed to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah’s re-entrenchment. A review of the advanced weapons pulled out of Hezbollah’s compounds by the IDF in the area and the huge quantity of arms involved demonstrates this point.
The LAF has redeployed troops to areas south of the Litani River, as stipulated in Resolution 1701. While this redeployment has been publicized, it is far from sufficient. True enforcement requires the removal of Hezbollah’s weaponry from civilian homes and strongholds, their transfer to secure locations and transparent reporting. Unfortunately, the LAF’s track record before the current war includes instances of seizing weapons only to return them to Hezbollah.
In addition, the IDF’s ground offensive was limited to a number of kilometers inside of Southern Lebanon; areas north of there remain riddled with Hezbollah’s military capabilities. As recent history has demonstrated, airstrikes are not enough to disarm hidden arms caches.
Lebanon’s broader political dysfunction compounds the challenges of enforcing the ceasefire agreement. A newly appointed prime minister, Nawaf Salam, now faces the monumental task of forming a government. The composition of this government will determine whether Hezbollah’s influence expands or contracts. As long as the temporary Lebanese government is still in office, Hezbollah will have control over significant government portfolios, such as public works, granting it access to key infrastructure and border crossings as well as the international Hariri Airport in Beirut. The new administration must decide whether to confront or accommodate Hezbollah’s power—a decision that will have profound implications for Lebanon’s future. As a member of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah will use its power to prevent the government from disarming it.
The crux of Lebanon’s crisis lies in the fundamental relationship between the state and Hezbollah. Unlike most nations, Lebanon has not designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. This allows the Iranian-backed proxy to operate with impunity, participating in government while maintaining a parallel military and civilian structure. As long as this dual role persists, Beirut cannot achieve true sovereignty or stability.
Without confronting Hezbollah’s role as a state within a state, efforts to disarm it will remain ineffective. Even after the clear blows it suffered, Hezbollah is fully invested in the reconstruction process of its own civilian and social base, while preserving its state within a state status.
A failure to enforce the ceasefire agreement will have tangible consequences for the people of Lebanon and Israel. For Israeli civilians in the north, the prospect of renewed hostilities that could stem from Hezbollah responding to future Israeli enforcement efforts, cast a shadow on the future of daily life there. For the ceasefire to succeed, the Lebanese government must take decisive action to disarm Hezbollah and assert its authority, including closing its banks.
America has a critical role to play as a mediator and guarantor of the ceasefire. It will have to decide how it will respond if the Lebanese Army fails to enforce the truce despite deploying to Southern Lebanon. It must hold Lebanon accountable for its commitments under Resolution 1701, demanding transparency and measurable progress with a clear deadline.
As the withdrawal deadline approaches, uncertainty abounds. Will the LAF begin meaningful enforcement? Will Hezbollah retaliate if its activities are curtailed by the IDF with firepower and airstrikes, as it is now? And will the international community hold Lebanon accountable?
For Israel, the dilemma is acute. Withdrawing as agreed under the ceasefire risks leaving part of Hezbollah’s infrastructure intact and allowing for re-entrenchment, posing a persistent threat. However, remaining in Southern Lebanon beyond the deadline risks international condemnation and escalates tensions with Hezbollah.
Ultimately, Lebanon’s future hinges on resolving the fundamental tension between it as a sovereign state and Hezbollah’s shadow as an Iranian-backed state. Without addressing this root cause, any ceasefire or agreement will be a temporary bandage on a chronic wound.
Beirut must choose between being a sovereign state or a host for an Iranian terror army, and the international community must be decisive in pushing Lebanon to make the right decision.